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Unpopular Constitutionalism 
MILA VERSTEEG* 
Constitutions are commonly thought to express nations’ highest values. They 
are often proclaimed in the name of “We the People” and are regarded—by 
scholars and the general public alike—as an expression of the people’s views and 
values. This Article shows empirically that this widely held image of constitutions 
does not correspond with the reality of constitution making around the world. The 
Article contrasts the constitutional-rights choices of ninety countries between 1981 
and 2010 with data from nearly one-half million survey responses on cultural, 
religious, and social values conducted over the same period. It finds, surprisingly, 
that in this period, the link between nations’ specific constitutional choices and 
their citizens’ values has generally been weak or nonexistent. The Article presents 
additional evidence from an original survey that reveals that, overwhelmingly, 
people want to enshrine their values in their constitution. Together, these findings 
suggest that the world’s constitutions are not meaningfully supported by the people 
they represent and that the global practice of constitution-making can be 
characterized as an exercise in “unpopular constitutionalism.” 
The Article attributes this finding to a dilemma that lies at the heart of 
constitutional design. When constitutions serve as unique and defining statements 
of national ideals and popular values, they may flout universal human rights norms 
or well-established principles of constitutional design. On the other hand, when 
constitutional rules merely reflect sound constitutional design and universal right 
norms, they may be remote from the people’s values and traditions and therefore 
fail in practice. The findings suggest that constitution-makers have largely resolved 
this dilemma in favor of universal rights and ready-made constitutional models, 
which explains the disconnect from popular values. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional values are often at odds with popular values. When South 
Africa’s 1996 post-apartheid constitution was written, 88% of all South Africans 
considered homosexuality to be morally unacceptable,1 but the new constitution 
nonetheless guaranteed equal protection regardless of sexual orientation.2 By 
contrast, the Netherlands, where only 22% of the population opposes 
homosexuality, has never protected gay rights in its constitution.3 In Morocco, a 
recent opinion poll revealed that 95% of the population would not go on a legal 
strike under any circumstance,4 even though its constitution proclaims that the right 
to strike is one of the nation’s highest values.5 By contrast, 99% of the British 
population was willing to go on strike, but the right to strike lacks constitutional 
status in British law.6 In the Dominican Republic, 86% of the population wanted a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. World Values Survey Ass’n, World Values Survey 1981–2008 Official Aggregate 
v.20090901 (2009), http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp; see infra Table 1 for 
details on the survey question related to homosexuality. 
 2. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 9(3) (“The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.”). 
 3. World Values Survey Ass’n, supra note 1. 
 4. Id.; see infra Table 1 for details on the survey question related to the right to strike. 
 5. ROYAUME DU MAROC [CONSTITUTION], Sept. 13, 1996, art. 14 (Morocco) (“The 
right of strike shall be guaranteed.”). 
 6. The overwhelming majority of countries analyzed in this Article have a written 
constitution that consists of a single document. The British Constitution is different, 
however, in that it consists of unwritten conventions and judicial interpretations, as well as 
legislation that enjoys semi-constitutional status. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 22 (8th ed. 1915) (defining a constitution as “all 
rules which directly or indirectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign 
power in the state”). For the purpose of the analysis presented in this Article, the following 
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stronger protection of the natural environment—even at the expense of higher 
taxes7—but the constitutional document is silent on environmental protection. By 
contrast, a right to a healthy environment is enshrined in the Lithuanian 
Constitution,8 even though no more than 24% of Lithuanians were willing to pay 
for increased environmental protection.9 
Such disconnects between constitutional texts and popular values stand in stark 
contrast with how constitutions are perceived by constitutional scholars and the 
general public alike. Ever since nations have been writing constitutions, these 
documents have been conceptualized as social contracts between the people and 
their government, rooted in the “consent of the governed.”10 Today, constitutions 
are commonly proclaimed in the name of “We the People”11 and are often 
approved by popular referendum.12 Constitutional scholars routinely claim that one 
of the leading goals of constitutional law is to articulate, preserve, or construct the 
highest values of the nation and its people.13 
                                                                                                                 
documents were considered to be constitutional ones: Magna Carta, 1297, 25 Edw. 1, cc. 1, 
9, 29; Habeas Corpus Act, 1640, 16 Car. 1, c. 10; Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2; 
Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2; Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13; Human 
Rights Act, 1998, c. 42; Freedom of Information Act, 2000, c. 36. The right to strike is not 
enshrined in any of these documents, nor does it enjoy constitutional status through judicial 
law making or conventions. See Federico Fabbrini, Europe in Need of a New Deal: On 
Federalism, Free Market, and the Right to Strike, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1175, 1191–94 (2012) 
(describing the U.K. government’s refusal to recognize the strike as a right, instead of 
treating it as a statutory freedom). 
 7. World Values Survey Ass’n, supra note 1; see infra Table 1 for details on the 
survey question related to environmental values. 
 8. LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [CONSTITUTION], Oct. 25, 1992, art. 53 (Lith.) 
(“The State and each person must protect the environment from harmful influences.”); id. 
art. 54 (“The State shall take care of the protection of the natural environment, wildlife and 
plants, individual objects of nature and areas of particular value and shall supervise a 
sustainable use of natural resources, their restoration and increase.”). 
 9. World Values Survey Ass’n, supra note 1. 
 10. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these 
truths to be self-evident . . . . That . . . [g]overnments . . . deriv[e] their just powers from the 
consent of the governed . . . .”). 
 11. Denis J. Galligan, The Sovereignty Deficit in Modern Constitutions, 33 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 702, 707 (2013) (showing that a majority of democratic constitutions are 
proclaimed in the name of the people). 
 12. See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & Justin Blount, Does the Process of 
Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 201, 207 fig.1 (2009) 
(documenting, empirically, that over 40% of all constitutions today require approval by 
popular referendum). 
 13. See, e.g., BEAU BRESLIN, FROM WORDS TO WORLDS: EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL 
FUNCTIONALITY 5 (2009) (noting that the primary function of constitutions is to “imagine 
and then help to realize a shared collective existence”); ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & 
JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 38 (2009) (noting that a 
“function that constitutions serve is the symbolic one of defining the nation and its goals”); 
VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 155 (2009) 
(describing constitutions as “forms of national self-expression, providing the framework for 
the working out within a particular ‘nomos’ of its contests, commitments, and identity” 
(citation omitted)); GARY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 3 (2010) (arguing that one 
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Most contemporary constitutional theorists—including both popular 
constitutionalists and judicial supremacists—believe that constitutions ought to 
enjoy larger democratic legitimacy than ordinary legislation. Popular 
constitutionalists see constitutions as documents created both by the people and for 
the people.14 They argue not only that constitutions should reflect popular values,15 
but also that “the people themselves” should interpret and implement them.16 While 
popular interpretation and implementation might be controversial, the view that 
constitutions should reflect popular values is not.17 Even defenders of judicial 
supremacy think that constitutions should reflect the people’s highest values. These 
theorists build on the normative claim that, in order to solve the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty inherent in constitutional adjudication, constitutions 
ought to be more democratic than ordinary legislation.18 They claim that 
constitutions should be made in special moments of “higher lawmaking,” in which 
the people come together, transcend their ordinary short-sighted interests, and 
articulate their highest aspirations and most deeply held values.19 Under this logic, 
constitutions represent reasoned deliberation by the people, while ordinary 
legislation represents the short-sighted bargaining, fears, and passions of elected 
representatives.20 The invalidation of ordinary legislation that contradicts the 
                                                                                                                 
of the core functions of constitutional law is to articulate the nation’s distinct identity); 
MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14 (2008) (“Expressivism suggests that a 
nation has a (single) self-understanding that its constitution expresses.” (emphasis in 
original)); Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, Constitutions as Expressive Documents, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 329, 333–38 (Barry Weingast & Donald 
A. Wittman eds., 2006) (emphasizing that written constitutions express national 
self-understanding); Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on 
the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640, 648–50 (1999) 
(suggesting that, amongst other things, constitutions serve to express national identity); 
H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African 
Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65, 65–66 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993) (noting that 
constitutions are inextricably linked to sovereignty and proclaim the nation’s highest values). 
 14. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW passim (2004) (suggesting that “popular constitutionalism” entails a 
continuous involvement of the people in the writing, interpretation, and implementation of 
the constitutional document).  
 15. See id. at 7 (describing the Constitution as “fundamentally, an act of popular will: 
the people’s charter, made by the people”).  
 16. Id. at 7–8 (suggesting that for most of American history “‘the people 
themselves’     . were responsible for seeing that [the Constitution] was properly interpreted 
and implemented”). 
 17. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The People’s Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at A32 
(suggesting that giving people the last word over the constitution is “taking the law out of 
constitutional law” and “if constitutional law were but a vessel into which the people could 
pour whatever they wanted it to contain at any given moment” the whole point of framing a 
constitution will be lost). 
 18. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 6 (1991). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (emphasizing that constitutions are written by the people, while ordinary 
legislation is written by the people’s elected representatives); see also JOHN FINN, 
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constitution, while undemocratic at face value, merely channels the true will of the 
people.21 With a constitution, “Peter sober binds Peter drunk,” so the story goes.22 
Thus, the one idea that unites otherwise divided schools of constitutional thought is 
that a nation’s highest document should reflect the will of the people. 
The general public also commonly perceives the constitution as an articulation 
of its ideals and values. To illustrate, the American Tea Party movement claims 
that the Constitution reflects America’s highest values, and it has mobilized to 
protect those values from what it considers to be an intrusive Congress.23 Similar 
claims permeate the constitutional discourse of other countries. From a wave of 
recent radical populist constitutions in Latin America,24 to the 2011 Hungarian 
constitution, to the newly written Egyptian constitution, claims of popular values 
and identity often surround the adoption of new constitutional documents.25 
This Article suggests that these widely held images of the nature of 
constitutional law do not correspond with the reality of constitution-making around 
the world. Drawing on an original dataset that spans the right-related contents of all 
national constitutions, the Article shows that constitutions do not usually align with 
popular opinion. Specifically, the Article contrasts countries’ choices on 
constitutional rights between 1981 and 2010 with data from nearly one-half million 
household surveys on people’s cultural, religious, and social values in ninety 
countries from the same period. The analysis reveals that there is generally no 
connection between specific constitutional choices and popular opinion.26 For 
instance, popular opinion on homosexuality does not correlate with constitutional 
protection of gay rights, popular opinion on abortion does not correlate with 
                                                                                                                 
CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 5 (1991) (quoting 
John Potter Stockton’s position in debates over the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: 
“[c]onstitutions are chains with which men bind themselves in their sane moments that they 
may not die by a suicidal hand in the day of their frenzy” (citation omitted)); Jon Elster, 
Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE OVER TIME 35, 35–45 (George 
Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992) (conceptualizing constitutional commitment as a time 
inconsistency problem whereby rational pre-commitments enshrined in the constitution are 
to govern later moments of fear and passion). 
 21. ACKERMAN, supra note 18, at 6 (noting that a normal electoral victory does not give 
politicians the “mandate to enact an ordinary statute that overturns the considered judgments 
previously reached by the People”). 
 22. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSION AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL 
GOVERNMENT 135 (1995) (suggesting that the constitution represents “Peter sober” while 
ordinary legislation represents “Peter drunk”). 
 23. See Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea Party 
Movement?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 288, 292 (2011) (“The Tea Party movement 
locates the fundamental principles that form the American character in the Constitution, and 
it argues that only a revival of these principles can save the nation from ruin.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 24. See Phoebe King, Neo-Bolivarian Constitutional Design, in THE SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 366, 367 (Denis Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 
2013) (describing the recent constitutions of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia as radical 
populist documents). 
 25. See infra Part VI.C (describing claims of national identity and popular values 
context of the new Hungarian and Egyptian constitutions). 
 26. See infra Part III. 
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constitutional protection of the unborn, and popular opinion on the environment 
does not correlate with constitutional protection of the environment. 
What is more, it turns out that most people do not want their constitution to be 
disconnected from their values. This Article presents additional findings from an 
original survey developed by the author and circulated among over a thousand 
respondents from different countries. Although the sample size is too small to draw 
any definite conclusions, the survey reveals that people generally do prefer their 
constitution do reflect their values. This finding therefore suggests that a significant 
discrepancy exists between what people want from their constitution and what the 
document actually provides. The global practice of constitution-making, this Article 
suggests, is characterized by unpopular constitutionalism. 
This Article attributes this finding to a dilemma that lies at the heart of 
constitutional design.27 Constitutional theory notwithstanding, for those writing a 
constitution, the constitution is not only a forum to express popular values, but also 
an instrument to articulate and protect universal human rights norms, and a tool to 
design the nation. In several ways, these different objectives can be inconsistent 
with each other. When constitutions serve as unique and defining statements of 
national ideals and values, they may flout universal human rights norms or 
well-established principles of constitutional design. At the same time, where 
constitutional rules merely reflect sound constitutional design and universal values, 
they may be remote from the people’s values and traditions and fail in practice. The 
empirical data presented in this Article suggest that constitution-makers have 
resolved the dilemma in favor of universal rights and ready-made constitutional 
models, which explains constitutions’ disconnect from popular values. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I conceptualizes how 
popular values are reflected in national constitutions. It draws attention to 
preambles, participatory procedures, and bills of rights as modes to express a 
commitment to popular views and values, and it explains why the focus of this 
Article is on how constitutional-rights choices reflect popular values. 
Part II introduces the data used to examine the connection between popular 
opinion and constitutions. Part III.A and Part III.B explore whether countries 
whose people deeply hold certain values are more likely to enshrine those values in 
their constitutions. This Part’s main finding is that cross-country differences in 
popular values do not explain cross-country differences in constitutional rights. 
Part IV explores to what extent each national constitution aligns with popular 
values. Part IV.A calculates, for each country in each year, the degree to which that 
country’s constitution aligns with popular values and ranks the world’s 
constitutions according to their populist nature. Part IV.B reveals that constitutional 
populism is not random, but that some types of countries are more likely to possess 
unpopular constitutions than others. Specifically, it finds that younger constitutions 
and more comprehensive constitutions are more likely to align with popular 
opinion than constitutions that are old or sparse. It also finds that constitutional 
populism has an aspirational character: countries in which constitutional 
commitments remain unfulfilled are most likely to possess populist constitutions. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. See infra Part VI.C (introducing the dilemma). 
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Part V presents an original survey of over one thousand people from eleven 
countries and explores whether people prefer to enshrine their values in their 
constitution. The survey suggests that the overwhelming majority of respondents 
do want their constitution to represent their values, which suggests that the 
disconnect between constitutional choices and popular values implies an unpopular 
constitutionalism, whereby a substantial portion of the world’s constitutions do not 
enshrine the values of the people they are supposed to represent. Part V.B focuses 
on American respondents only and how they perceive their constitution. It shows 
that, unlike their foreign counterparts, Americans are more reluctant to demand 
rights of a socioeconomic nature, even when those rights align with their values. 
Based on this insight, this Part reassesses how popular the U.S. Constitution 
actually is. 
Part VI sets forth possible explanations for unpopular constitutionalism. It 
suggests that real-world constitution-makers are not merely concerned with writing 
documents that reflect popular values, but also face competing considerations. 
Functionalism and universalism are two such competing considerations that may 
steer constitution-makers away from popular self-expression. This Article 
concludes by reflecting on the implications of its core findings for contemporary 
constitutional theory. 
I. CONSTITUTIONS AS POPULIST DOCUMENTS 
Even though constitutions are commonly conceptualized as expressions of 
popular views and values, different scholars use the idea of popular self-expression 
to mean substantially different things. Indeed, the literature is characterized by a 
variety of claims, ranging from the notion that constitutions substantively reflect 
national values or identity,28 to procedural accounts of popular involvement,29 to 
theories of judicial interpretation that emphasize that courts should interpret the 
constitution in line with popular values.30 This Part will distinguish and 
conceptualize three different ways in which constitutional texts themselves can 
demonstrate fidelity to popular values: (1) they can proclaim popular values and 
national character in the preamble; (2) they can demand popular involvement in the 
drafting or ratification of the constitution; and (3) they can adopt rights and rights-
related policies that substantively reflect popular opinion. The remainder of this 
Part will discuss each of these in turn and explain why this Article focuses 
primarily on the third method; that is, how constitutional choices substantively 
reflect popular values. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. See, e.g., JACOBSOHN, supra note 13. 
 29. See, e.g., Ginsburg et al., supra note 12 (describing popular involvement in 
constitution-making). 
 30. See, e.g., Robert Post, Theories of Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 29 
(2009) (describing all of U.S. constitutional interpretation as a “characterization of the 
national ethos”); see also Robert Leider, Our Non-Originalist Right to Bear Arms, 
89 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2014). 
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A. Preambles 
Perhaps the easiest way for a constitution to express popular values is by 
proclaiming such values in the preamble. While the Preamble to the 
U.S. Constitution merely makes a relatively brief statement on behalf of “We the 
People,”31 a number of constitutions contain elaborate expressions of the people’s 
highest values, the triumph of popular rule, the glories of the nation’s leader, and a 
range of aspects of the nation’s past.32 Preambles, according to one commentator, 
are like “mission statements”: they set out the nation’s goals for the future in light 
of the experience of its past.33 Perhaps more than any other part of the constitution, 
the preamble offers the perfect opportunity to express what is distinctive about the 
nation and its people.34 
Examples of preambles that narrate the nation’s past and envision its future are 
plentiful. The Preamble to the newly written 2011 Hungarian Constitution, which is 
almost two pages long, declares the constitution to be “a covenant among 
Hungarians past, present and future” that “expresses the nation’s will and the form 
in which we want to live,” references “with pride” “king Saint Stephen” who “built 
the Hungarian state . . . one thousand years ago,” recognizes “the role of 
Christianity in preserving nationhood,” and commits to “safeguarding our heritage, 
our unique language, [and] Hungarian culture,” amongst other things.35 
Likewise, the Polish Constitution of 1997 references how Poland “recovered, in 
1989, the possibility of a sovereign and democratic of its fate” and expresses 
gratitude “to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for independence 
achieved at great sacrifice” and “for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of 
the Nation and in universal human values.”36 Perhaps more radically, the Preamble 
of the 1979 Constitution of Iran proclaims “the cultural, social, political, and 
economic institutions of Iranian society . . . which represent the earnest aspiration 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 32. See infra Figure 1. 
 33. Jeff King, Constitutions as Mission Statements, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 73, 81 (suggesting that constitutions are 
like “mission statements” that articulate the “core, constitutive political commitments of the 
community” and “express the political ideas that animate the constitution and polity more 
broadly, including . . . the values it seeks to respect in its state planning”). 
 34. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 13, at 18 (“Preambles are a particular location of 
these kinds of national specificities.”); Kevin L. Cope, South Sudan’s Dualistic Constitution, 
in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 295, 314 
(noting that the preamble is the part where the new South Sudanese Constitution expresses 
constitutional identity); Denis Galligan & Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the 
Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 3, 10 (identifying preambles as a forum 
to express national values); Mark Tushnet, Some Reflections on Method in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 67, 79 (Sujit Choudhry 
ed., 2006) (“Preambles to constitutions may be particularly useful for an expressivist.”). 
 35. A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
HUNGARY], pmbl. 
 36. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, pmbl. 
(Pol.). 
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of the Islamic Ummah” and references “the great Islamic Revolution of Iran,” and 
“the awakened conscience of the nation, under the leadership of the eminent 
marji‘ al-taqlīd, Ayatullāh al-‘Uz ̣mā Imam Khumaynî, [which] came to perceive 
the necessity of pursuing an authentically Islamic and ideological line in its 
struggles.”37 In another ideological blend, the 1978 Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China contains a six-page preamble that celebrates the achievements of 
the “great leader” Mao Zedong, the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” as 
well as socialism in general.38 
A growing number of countries use constitutional preambles to make statements 
of popular values and national identity. According to my own coding of all of the 
world’s written constitutions since 1946, about 25% of all constitutions today contain 
preambles that do so.39 Figure 1 depicts both the percentage of constitutions that 
contain a preamble, as well as the percentage of constitutions that contain a preamble 
that expresses popular values or narrates the nation’s history. Figure 1 shows that 
such references to identity and values have grown more common over time. At the 
end of the Second World War, only 5% of all constitutions contained preambles that 
made statements of national identity, while today that number is 25%. Not all 
preambles make such references: some preambles contain more universalist claims, 
defining the nation’s relationship to the world community or to particular foreign 
states.40 But with growing frequency, constitutional designers are using preambles to 
express the highest values of the nation and its people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of constitutions with a preamble and percentage of constitutions that 
refer to national values or national history. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], pmbl. 
 38. XIANFA pmbl. (1978) (China). 
 39. The full dataset and coding methodology will be introduced in Part III. 
 40. See Tom Ginsburg, Nick Foti & Daniel Rockmore, “We the Peoples”: The Global 
Origins of Constitutional Preambles 1, 7 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (finding that preambles do not only express national values, but also contain more 
internationalist statements). 
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Although preambles can articulate national identity, their commitment to 
popular values is ultimately merely rhetorical. Preambles are not usually 
justiciable—that is, they cannot be enforced in court.41 That does not mean they are 
meaningless: statements of national character can serve an important unifying 
function for the nation. By appealing to the nation’s past, preambles can help to 
overcome divisions of the present and the future.42 Their symbolic significance 
notwithstanding, preambles do not usually produce actual bodies of constitutional 
law that are justiciable, and that preserve and safeguard popular values from future 
law-making activity. 
B. Participatory Procedures 
Like preambles, participatory procedures (that require popular involvement in 
the drafting or promulgation of the constitution) signal intent to respect popular 
values; but, like preambles, they also do not necessarily translate into actual 
constitutional laws that reflect popular values. 
There are different ways in which people can participate in the making of their 
constitution. A growing number of constitutions require ratification by popular 
referendum. Figure 2 shows that today 34% of all constitutions require ratification 
by popular referendum, while in 1950 only 7% did.43 In some countries, citizens 
not only ratify the final constitution but also are actively involved in the drafting 
stage. One mode of more active involvement in constitution-making is through the 
direct election of a constitutional assembly.44 For example, the assembly that wrote 
the draft 2011 Icelandic Constitution resulted from a nation-wide election, in which 
“[t]ruck drivers, university professors, lawyers, journalists and computer geeks 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. See NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB 
BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 11 (2002) (noting that 
“lengthy sections describing the basic goals, ideology, or the program of the state,” as in 
preambles, “may be sincere when issued but are too vaguely worded to bear much legal 
weight; they are not designed to limit the government”); Ginsburg, supra note 40, at 4 
(surveying preambles in the world’s constitutions and finding that most preambles are not 
justiciable). The notable exception is the preamble of the 1958 Constitution of France. See 
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 71-44 DC, July 16, 1971, 
J.O. 7114 (Fr.) (declaring the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the preamble of 
the 1946 Constitution of France to be part of the 1958 preamble, and declaring the preamble 
to be justiciable). 
 42. For example, the preamble of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution deliberately invokes 
“the historic example of our liberator Simon Bolívar and the heroism and sacrifice of our 
aboriginal ancestors,” because constitution-makers recognized that “popular sentiment that 
distinguishes [Bolivar] as a symbol of national unity.” See King, supra note 24, at 373 (citing 
the Exposicion de Motivos [Explanation of Motives] for the Constitution as published in 
Gaceta Oficial 5453, Mar. 24 2000). 
 43. This data comes from the COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, 
comparativeconstitutionsproject.org. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 12, at 207 (introducing and 
summarizing the empirical data on the prevalence of constitutions that require ratification by 
popular referendum). 
 44. See id. at 208 (describing modes of participation whereby the citizens provide direct 
input into the writing of the constitutional document). 
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[were] all among the candidates.”45 In another mode of active involvement, the 
citizens of South Africa, Brazil, Uganda, and Eritrea, as well as others, offered 
direct input into the drafting of their nations’ new founding documents.46 In South 
Africa, the constitutional assembly went to towns and villages to deliberate about 
the document, while the Icelandic constitutional assembly used social media, such 
as Twitter and Facebook, to seek popular input.47 In general, there has been a 
strong trend toward participatory procedures in constitution-making and there 
exists a growing consensus that such participation is the wave of the future.48 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. Alda Sigmundsdottir, Iceland Elects Ordinary Folk to Draft Constitution, 
BOSTON.COM, Nov. 26, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/ 2010/11
/26/iceland_elects_ordinary_folk_to_draft_constitution/. See generally Jennifer Widner, 
Constitution Writing & Conflict Resolution: Data & Summaries, PRINCETON U. (Aug. 2005), 
http://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/about/index.html (describing the importance of directly 
elected constitutional assemblies). 
 46. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 12, at 208 (describing modes of participation 
whereby citizens provide direct input into the writing of the constitutional document); Erik 
Martinez Kuhonta, The Paradox of Thailand’s 1997 “People’s Constitution”: Be Careful 
What You Wish For, 48 ASIAN SURV. 373 (2008) (describing the process of adopting 
Thailand’s “People’s Constitution”); Bereket Habte Selassie, Constitution Making in 
Eritrea: A Process-Driven Approach, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE 
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 57, 61–65 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010) (describing the 
widespread popular involvement in the drafting of the 1997 Eritrea constitution); Aili Mari 
Tripp, The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF 
TRANSITION, supra, at 158, 165–69 (describing the substantial involvement of an elected 
“constituent assembly” in the writing of the 1995 Ugandan constitution). 
 47. See Hassen Ebrahim & Laurel E. Miller, Creating the Birth Certificate of a New South 
African: Constitution Making After Apartheid, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, 
supra note 46, at 111, 133–39 (recounting the widespread popular participation in the making 
of the 1994 South African Constitution, which was “distinguishing . . . and from comparative 
constitutionalist perspective, precedent-setting”); Anne Meuwese, Popular 
Constitution-Making: The Case of Iceland, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 469, 476–89 (describing the widespread popular involvement 
in the writing of the Iceland Constitution, from the involvement of 1000 randomly elected 
citizens, to the elected constitutional assembly and the use of Facebook and Twitter to get 
popular input). 
 48. As Richard Solomon, President of the U.S. Institute of Peace, summarizes the new 
prevailing wisdom: “[t]here are no one-size-fits-all formulas or models[,]” but 
“well-conducted processes can . . . contribute to building stable, peaceful states, whereas 
poorly conducted processes most certainly undercut such efforts.” See Richard H. Solomon, 
Foreword to FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note 46, at xi, xi; see also 
Louis Aucoin, Introduction to FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note 46, 
at xiii, xiii (suggesting that there exists “an emerging international norm that 
constitution-making processes should be democratic, transparent, and participatory”); 
Thomas M. Franck & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Norms of International Law Relating to the 
Constitution-Making Process, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note 
46, at 3, 8 (suggesting the existence of a “new approach” to constitution making that started 
in Africa in the 1990s and “emphasizes participation and puts great premium on dialogue, 
debate, consultation, and participation”); Vivien Hart, Constitution Making and the Right to 
Take Part in a Public Affair, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note 46, 
at 20, 20 (suggesting that “[t]raditionally, negotiating a constitution was the province of 
1144 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:1133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of constitutions that require ratification by popular referendum. 
 
Yet popular involvement does not automatically translate into constitutional 
texts that also substantively reflect popular opinion. Referendums, for example, do 
not allow for any substantive popular input; they merely present the people with a 
yes-or-no decision.49 Referendums are not usually held on a right-by-right basis; 
they require a single vote on an entire document or a whole package of 
amendments. The result may be an affirmative vote for the constitution even when 
a citizen does not agree with all of its individual provisions. Indeed, there are 
numerous instances in which authoritarian leaders were able to extend their term 
limits through popular referenda that required citizens to vote for a series of 
constitutional reforms that offered attractive rights and simultaneously extended 
executive power.50 Perhaps most famously, Napoleon Bonaparte used a popular 
referendum to proclaim himself the emperor of France.51 
Even popular input in the drafting stage does not ensure that the resulting 
documents reflect popular opinion. According to one commentator, the highly 
inclusive constitution-making process in Iceland became, in part, a “borrowing 
exercise[],” whereby the constitutional assembly consulted foreign constitutions 
and social science research by Professors Persson and Tabellini.52 Likewise, the 
                                                                                                                 
political leaders who held power” while “[d]rafting the constitutional text was expert work” 
but that there has been a “significant change” toward more popular participation). 
 49. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 12, at 207–08 (noting that a referendum is “only an 
up or down vote over a package of provisions”). 
 50. Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez, Wiki-Constitutionalism, NEW REPUBLIC (May 25, 2010, 
12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/75150/wiki-constitutionalism (“Latin 
American leaders have discovered that, by packaging ever-longer lists of promises and rights 
alongside greater executive functions, they can make a new constitution appealing enough to 
the masses that they will vote for it in a referendum.”). 
 51. PETER EMERSON, DEFINING DEMOCRACY 144 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that, “just to 
make it all democratic,” a referendum was introduced in 1804 to approve Napoleon as 
emperor). 
 52. Meuwese, supra note 47, at 485. 
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South African Constitution, for all its popular involvement, has been described as a 
product of universal norms and values.53 According to Professor Klug, it was “the 
emergence of a thin, yet significant, international political culture” that explains 
why South Africa adopted a powerful constitutional court even though the judiciary 
had served as a tool of repression for the apartheid regime in the past.54 The same 
international culture also led the South African constitution-makers to heavily rely 
on international treaties when drafting their bill of rights.55 
Conversely, constitutions written without any popular input can nonetheless 
closely resemble popular opinion. The Japanese Constitution of 1946 offers a 
striking example. Although drafted covertly by General McArthur and imposed 
unilaterally by the World War II victors, its choices closely corresponded with the 
values of the Japanese people.56 For example, historical opinion poll data reveals 
that the Japanese people supported limits on the emperor’s power and favored more 
rights, even though the local political elites did not.57 Thus, while there likely exists 
a correlation between popular participation and a constitution’s reflection of 
substantive popular values, these anecdotes show how the two are distinct 
concepts. For this reason, the focus of this Article is on substantive constitutional 
choices, not on procedure. 
C. Bills of Rights 
A commitment to respect popular values is likely to be more than a mere 
rhetorical or procedural commitment when it is contained in a bill of rights. The 
bill of rights represents a set of substantive choices that are typically judicially 
enforceable and that can reveal certain views and values that are widely held in a 
nation. Even though rights are often considered to be universal as a normative 
matter, the empirical record suggests otherwise. Rights are often culturally 
contested, not just between the West and the Global South or between Western and 
Asian values, for instance, but also between and within liberal democracies.58 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH 
AFRICA’S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 7 (2000). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Richard Cameron Blake, The Frequent Irrelevance of US Judicial Decisions in 
South Africa, 15 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 192, 198 (1999) (describing the South African 
constitution of 1996 as a “product of other nations’ constitutions . . . and contemporary 
human rights conventions” (citation omitted)). 
 56. David S. Law, The Myth of the 1mposed Constitution, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 239, 263 (suggesting, based on historical 
opinion poll data, that the Japanese Constitution closely resembles popular values, but not 
the values of the ruling elites at the time). 
 57. Id. at 263 (describing the historical opinion poll data). 
 58. For an introduction to the cultural relativism debate, compare infra Part VI.B, with 
Josiah A.M. Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective, 
9 HUM. RTS. Q. 309, 322–29 (1987) (describing an “African worldview” and how it shapes 
African conceptions of rights that are more communitarian in character), and Bilahari 
Kausikan, Asia’s Different Standard, 92 FOREIGN POL’Y 24, 34–40 (1993) (suggesting that 
human rights are merely Western rights and articulating a distinct Asian perspective on 
rights that emphasizes socioeconomic rights over civil and political freedoms). 
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In September 2012, a YouTube video mocking the Prophet Muhammad set off a 
wave of protests in the Arab world. In no fewer than twenty countries, protesters 
took to the streets, carrying signs that read “Shut Up America” and demanding that 
President Obama apologize.59 The protests resemble those from 2006, when a 
series of Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed sparked violent protests 
around the world.60 At the heart of these episodes is a clash between those who 
value free speech first and foremost and those who consider their religious values 
to be paramount. President Obama responded to the most recent protests with a 
passionate defense of freedom of expression in the U.N. General Assembly,61 but 
democratic nations continue to stand divided on the extent and nature of the right to 
free expression. Egypt’s then newly elected president, Mohamed Morsi, in the 
same U.N. General Assembly meeting, responded directly to President Obama by 
saying that Egypt only supports “freedom of expression that is not used to incite 
hatred against anyone.”62 Mr. Morsi’s view resembles those of European nations, 
which do not extend the freedom of expression to hate speech,63 Holocaust denial,64 
or even the selling of Nazi paraphernalia on Yahoo and eBay.65 
Like the freedom of expression, religious freedom also divides democratic 
nations. Consider, for example, the debate over the wearing of the Islamic burqa. In 
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, there is broad popular and legislative 
support for a burqa ban, which prohibits women from wearing a face-covering veil 
in public.66 Their main concern is that the burqa violates women’s rights. Burqas, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. David D. Kirkpatrick, Cultural Clash Fuels Muslims Raging at Film, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 17, 2012, at A1 (describing the widespread protests as a clash of values between the 
freedom of expression in the “individualistic West” and religious values in the Arab world). 
 60. Mutual Incomprehension, Mutual Outrage, ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2006, at 26 
(describing the violent protests that followed publication of these cartoons in a Danish 
newspaper). 
 61. See Editorial, President Obama at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2012, at A26 
(noting that President Obama contended that “the strongest weapon against hateful speech is 
not repression; it is more speech”). 
 62. Neil MacFarquhar, At U.N., Egypt and Yemen Urge Curbs on Free Speech, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2012, at A10. 
 63. See VENICE COMMISSION, BLASPHEMY, INSULT AND HATRED: FINDING ANSWERS IN A 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 11 (2010) (describing how the freedom of expression under the 
European Convention on Human Rights does not extend to hate speech). 
 64. See Ronald Sokol, Op-Ed., Is It a Crime or an Idiocy?; Holocaust Denial, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 20, 2007, at 5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/ opinion
/19iht-edsokol.4264282.html (describing how Holocaust denial is a criminal offense in most 
European countries, and noting how the United States takes a different position). 
 65. Sean Dodson, The Very Long Arm of the Law, GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2001, 1:15 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2001/nov/09/internetnews (describing how Yahoo 
was prohibited from selling Nazi paraphernalia in France and how eBay followed Yahoo’s 
lead in removing items from its website). See generally Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional 
First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 31 (Michael 
Ignatieff ed., 2005) (describing the United States as an outlier in its protection of free 
speech, and noting that “much of the rest of the developed democratic world” has after 
careful consideration “deliberately chosen a different course”). 
 66. See The Islamic Veil Across Europe, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2011, 5:20 PM), 
2014] UNPOPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 1147 
 
in French Prime Minister Sarkozy’s view, “imprison[] women” and are an affront 
to “national values of dignity and equality.”67 But British and American lawmakers 
and officials largely disagree. Former U.K. immigration minister Damian Green 
dismissed the ban as “rather un-British.”68 And U.S. State Department officials 
issued an outright condemnation of the French measure, calling it an undue 
restriction of religious freedom.69 Interestingly, opinion polls found that 70% of 
U.S. citizens oppose the ban, compared to a mere 17% in France.70 
It would seem that such differences in national values could affect the specific 
menu of rights in a country’s constitution. For example, the 1937 Irish 
Constitution, a deeply religious document enacted “in the Name of the Most Holy 
Trinity,”71 explicitly recognizes “the right to life of the unborn.”72 Most other 
European nations, however, reject the prohibition of abortion and express support 
for organizations like Women on Waves, which, in an attempt to secure the rights 
of Irish women, offers abortion services just outside Irish borders.73 These nations’ 
constitutions protect life, but they do not extend protections to the unborn. Most of 
the Latin American countries side with the Irish, however, and also extend 
constitutional protection to fetuses.74 In these countries, seemingly widely held 
popular values are reflected in the constitution. 
The constitutional status of socioeconomic rights provides another example of 
divergent views on the place of human rights values in constitutions. Most 
constitutions today not only contain traditional liberty rights but also include a set 
of positive social welfare rights, ranging from a right of access to education to a 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13038095 (reporting that legislation has been 
passed in France and Belgium that prohibits women from wearing a full-face Islamic veil); 
Bruno Waterfield, Netherlands to Ban the Burka, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 15, 2011, 5:40 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/8765673/Netherlands-to
-ban-the-burka.html (describing similar legislation in the Netherlands). 
 67. Mark McGivern, Two Women Arrested in Paris for Defying Ban on Islamic Veils, 
DAILY REC. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/two-women
-arrested-in-paris-for-defying-1100115. 
 68. David Mitchell, Op-Ed., If Britain Decides to Ban the Burqa Then I Might Just Start 
Wearing One, OBSERVER, July 25, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/ jul
/25/david-mitchell-burqa-ban-tattoos. 
 69. See US Reiterates Disappointment over French Burqa Ban, FRANCE 24, July 15, 2010, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20100715-usa-tells-france-not-ban-burqa-senate-bill-washington. 
 70. French Senate Approves Burqa Ban, CNN (Sept. 15, 2010, 5:17 AM), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-14/world/france.burqa.ban_1_burqa-overt-religious-symbols
-ban-last-year?_s=PM:WORLD (citing opinion poll data). 
 71. IR. CONST., 1937, pmbl. 
 72. Id. art. 40(3) (“The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.”). 
 73. See Who Are We, WOMEN ON WAVES, http://www.womenonwaves.org/en/page/650/ 
who-are-we. 
 74. According to my own coding of all written constitutions, fourteen constitutions 
protect the right to life for the unborn, six of which are located in Latin America. The Latin 
American countries that contain a right to life for the unborn in their constitutions are 
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Chile. 
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right to food.75 In Portugal, for example, an elaborate catalogue of socioeconomic 
rights was enshrined after the fall of the right-wing dictatorial regime and in 
response to widespread popular demands for such rights.76 Yet some other 
countries are remarkably resilient to this trend. The U.S. Constitution not only 
omits social welfare rights altogether, but is devoid of positive entitlements 
generally.77 In the absence of state action, there exist no constitutional 
entitlements.78 It has been noted that this approach reflects a long-standing 
constitutional tradition that “began with Locke and . . . stayed with Locke” and is 
an intrinsic part of the cultural heritage of the United States.79 Other nations, too, 
have constitutions of a distinctly libertarian character.80 It is these types of 
substantive constitutional choices that distinguish nations from each other and that 
this Article seeks to explore.81 
II. MEASURING CONSTITUTIONAL POPULISM 
Empirical analysis of the relationship between popular values and constitutional 
choices demands data on both the content of the world’s constitutions and popular 
opinion related to that content. To capture the rights-related content of the world’s 
constitutions, I draw on data that I collected based on the hand-coding of every 
national constitution written since 1946.82 Specifically, this original data set spans a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. According to my coding of all written constitutions, 83% of all constitutions today 
enshrine socioeconomic rights in some form. See infra Part II (introducing the constitutions 
data). 
 76. See Pedro C. Magalhães, Explaining the Constitutionalization of Social Rights: 
Portuguese Hypotheses and a Cross-National Test, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 432, 443–49 (describing the origins of 
Portugal’s elaborate socioeconomic rights provisions and attributing them to “the Portuguese 
legal tradition” and deeply held “values of social Catholicism”). 
 77. See Frank I. Michelman, The Protective Function of the State in the United States and 
Europe: The Constitutional Question, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 131, 134 
(Georg Nolte ed., 2005) (contrasting the state action doctrine in the United States with notions 
of protective duties in Europe). 
 78. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (setting 
forth the state action doctrine in U.S. constitutional law). 
 79. LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 6 (2d ed. 1991). 
 80. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global 
Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1221–26 (2011) (finding that some constitutions are 
distinctly libertarian in character, while others are more statist in nature). 
 81. See John Boli, Human Rights or State Expansion? Cross-National Definitions of 
Constitutional Rights, 1870–1970, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CONSTITUTING STATE, 
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 133, 138 (George M. Thomas et al. eds., 1987) (arguing that, for 
constitutions, “there is considerable uniformity in their structure” but that “[t]here is much less 
uniformity in their content”). 
 82. This data was first introduced in Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, The 
Transnational Origins of Constitutions: An Empirical Analysis, Sixth Annual Conference on 
Empirical Legal Studies (Nov. 4, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1865724, and subsequently analyzed in Law & Versteeg, 
supra note 80, at 1187–89. The 2006–2012 portion of the data was collected and introduced by 
David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863 (2013). 
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total of 751 constitutions adopted by 186 different countries from 1946 to 2012. 
For each constitution, the text of the entire document was analyzed, and 
information on 237 variables regarding both substantive rights and rights-
enforcement mechanisms was collected. This process is documented in greater 
detail in my earlier work.83 
From the larger dataset, I selected twelve rights-related constitutional 
provisions. These provisions represent specific choices of the kind that different 
nations may make differently, depending on their values. The twelve substantive 
constitutional choices included in the analysis are (1) the protection of family life; 
(2) the right to rest/leisure; (3) the right to work; (4) the protection of the 
environment; (5) the protection of marriage; (6) the right to petition; (7) the right to 
assembly; (8) the right to strike; (9) the protection of equality regardless of sexual 
orientation; (10) a prohibition of abortion (through protection of the unborn); 
(11) gender equality in labor relations; and (12) the protection of motherhood. 
These rights represent a mixture of first-generation negative liberty rights (petition, 
assembly, and gender equality), second-generation socioeconomic rights (rest, 
leisure, work, and strike), as well as some more recent rights relating to the family 
and traditional values (marriage, abortion, the family, and homosexuality).84 All of 
these rights are commonly found in the world’s constitutions. While the 
first-generation rights are almost universally embraced in constitutions globally, the 
other two categories are more contested. It is possible, therefore, that cross-country 
differences in values are more strongly reflected in the latter two, and especially the 
third, categories of rights. The sampling of these rights provisions was further 
guided and constrained by the necessity of choosing constitutional provisions for 
which corresponding popular opinion data could be found. The resulting list of 
twelve constitutional provisions can be found in the left-hand column of Table 1. 
I contrast these twelve specific constitutional choices with data from the World 
Values Survey (WVS).85 The World Values Survey represents opinion data from 
different countries, collected by a worldwide network of social scientists.86 As of 
today, the World Values Survey has conducted standardized surveys in ninety 
countries, covering about 88% of the world’s population.87 The surveys have been 
conducted in six waves, between 1981 and 2010, surveying a total of nearly half a 
million households.88 Most countries are surveyed in more than one wave, thereby 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. See Goderis & Versteeg, supra note 82, at pt. VI; Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 
1187–90 & nn.103–16. 
 84. Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 1225, 1231 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2007) 
(distinguishing first-generation “classical rights to civil and political participation, and to 
equality,” from “second generation” social and economic rights for individuals). 
 85. For documentation and online analysis of the World Values Survey data, see 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY (2012), http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. 
 86. See Ronald Inglehart, Foreword to VALUES CHANGE THE WORLD (2008) (describing 
the infrastructure of the World Values Survey). 
 87. Id. 
 88. I integrated the World Values Survey data with data from the European Values 
Study that conducted the exact same survey in an additional set of European countries. For a 
full overview of all countries, see INTEGRATED EVS/WVS 1981–2008 DATAFILE, 
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allowing for a comparison over time. The World Values Survey is designed to 
capture what people’s beliefs and values are. In each wave, a representative sample 
of each country’s public is interviewed, using a standardized questionnaire that is 
intended to capture “values concerning religion, gender roles, work motivations, 
democracy, good governance, social capital, political participation, tolerance of 
other groups, environmental protection and subjective wellbeing.”89 
From the World Values Survey, I selected twelve items from the standardized 
questionnaire that correspond to the twelve constitutional provisions listed in the 
left-hand column of Table 1. These twelve questionnaire items are listed in the 
right-hand column of Table 1. On most items, and with some variations, 
respondents are asked to rate a certain aspect or dimension of life (such as “work” 
or “leisure time”) as “very important,” “rather important,” “not very important,” or 
“not at all important.” 
Where possible, I selected the more specific questions. For example, instead of 
assessing whether people find their family “important” or “very important,” I 
picked a more specific question that enquires about family values (and specifically 
whether the respondent believes that a child, in order to grow up happily, needs a 
home with both a father and a mother). Likewise, instead of assessing whether 
people value their natural environment, I selected a question that asks whether 
people would be willing to spend money to protect the environment. And instead of 
simply asking whether people value gender equality in the abstract, I selected an 
item that asks people whether, in time of job scarcity, they believe that men are 
more entitled to jobs than women.90 The choice to use these more specific 
questions was guided by a desire to gauge how deeply certain values are held in a 
nation. 
For the purpose of my analysis, I calculated the proportion of respondents in 
each country that gave each of these answers, and I grouped together those who 
value each right and those who do not. The underlined responses in the right-hand 
column of Table 1 indicate which respondents were grouped together. The 
highlighted constitutional provisions in the left-hand side of Table 1 indicate which 
provisions they will be linked to in the empirical analysis.91 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSIntegratedEVSWVS.jsp?Idioma=I. Combined, these 
two surveys cover ninety countries, conducted in six waves, in the periods from 1981–1984, 
1989–1993, 1994–1999, 1999–2004, 2005–2006, and 2008–2010. 
 89. Inglehart, supra note 86, at 1. 
 90. The results do not depend on this selection. Specifically, if I replace some of the 
more specific questions with more general ones, the results presented in subsequent Parts of 
this Article remain the same. 
 91. I also experimented with alternative classifications of the respondents, but I did not 
find that this affected the findings presented in subsequent Parts. 
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Table 1. Constitutional provisions and corresponding questions in World Values 
Survey (WVS) 
 
  Constitutional provision 
 
Popular opinion (WVS) 
 
  
1. Family  
 
(found in 66% of all 
constitutions in 2010) 
Does the constitution provide 
protection for rights for the 
family?  
 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
Traditional family values. Do 
you think that a child needs a 
home with both a father and a 
mother to grow up happily? 
 
0 Tend to disagree 
1 Tend to agree 
 
 
2. Rest/Leisure  
 
(found in 42% of all 
constitutions in 2010) 
 
Does the constitution contain 
a right to rest and leisure or a 
goal for the government to 
protect and/or (gradually) 
provide rest and leisure?  
 
 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
How important is leisure time 
in your life? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Very important  
2 Rather important  
3 Not very important  
4 Not at all important 
 
 
3. Work  
 
(found in 81% of all 
constitutions in 2010) 
 
Does the constitution contain 
a right to work or a goal for 
the government to protect 
and/or (gradually) provide 
work? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
How important is work in 
your life? 
 
 
 
1 Very important  
2 Rather important  
3 Not very important  
4 Not at all important 
 
 
4. Environment  
 
(found in 65% of all 
constitutions in 2010) 
 
Does the constitution contain 
a right to a clean or healthy 
environment for citizens, or a 
goal for the government to 
protect and/or (gradually) 
provide this right? 
 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
I would agree to an increase in 
taxes if the extra money were 
used to prevent environmental 
pollution. 
 
 
 
 
1 Strongly agree  
2 Agree  
3 Disagree  
4 Strongly disagree 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
  
Constitutional provision 
 
Popular opinion (WVS) 
 
 
5. Marriage  
 
(found in 36% of all 
constitutions in 2010) 
 
Does the constitution provide 
a right to get married, or a 
special protection of 
marriage? 
 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
Do you agree or disagree with 
the following statement? 
“Marriage is an outdated 
institution.” 
 
 
0 Disagree  
1 Agree  
2 Other answer 
 
 
6. Petition  
 
(found in 50% of all 
constitutions in 2010) 
 
Does the constitution contain 
a right to petition, or a right to 
file complaints against, or 
requests with, the 
government? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No  
Did you ever sign a petition, 
do you think you might do so 
in the future, or would you 
never under any circumstance 
sign a petition? 
 
1 Have done  
2 Might do  
3 Would never do 
 
 
7. Assembly  
 
(found in 93% of all 
constitutions in 2010) 
 
Does the constitution provide 
for a right to assembly? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
Did you ever attend a 
lawful/peaceful 
demonstration, do you think 
you might do so in the future, 
or would you never under any 
circumstance attend a lawful 
demonstration? 
 
1 Have done  
2 Might do  
3 Would never do 
 
 
8. Strike  
 
(found in 45% of all 
constitutions in 2010) 
 
Does the constitution contain 
a right to strike? 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
Did you ever attend an official 
strike, do you think you might 
do so in the future, or would 
you never under any 
circumstance attend an 
official strike? 
 
1 Have done  
2 Might do  
3 Would never do 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
  
Constitutional provision 
 
Popular opinion (WVS) 
 
 
9. Homosexuality  
 
(found in 4% of all 
constitutions in 2010) 
 
Does the constitution protect 
equality regardless of sexual 
orientation? 
 
 
 
 
1Yes 
2 No 
Please tell me whether you 
think homosexuality can 
always be justified, never be 
justified, or something in 
between, using this scoring: 
 
 
1 Never justifiable 
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10 Always justifiable 
 
 
10. Abortion  
 
(found in 8% of all 
constitutions in 2010) 
 
Does the constitution 
(implicitly) prohibit abortion, 
by protecting life of “the 
unborn,” by stating that the 
right to life should be 
protected from the moment 
of conception onwards, 
or explicitly prohibiting 
abortion? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
Please tell me for whether you 
think abortion can always be 
justified, never be justified, or 
something in between, using 
this scoring? 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Never justifiable  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10 Always justifiable 
 
11. Gender equality in 
labor  
 
(found in 20% of all 
constitutions in 2010) 
 
Does the constitution contain 
equality for women in labor 
relations, e.g., women should 
receive equal pay for equal 
work? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
Do you think that, when jobs 
are scarce, men should have 
more right to a job than 
women? 
 
1 Agree  
2 Disagree  
3 Neither 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
  
Constitutional provision 
 
Popular opinion (WVS) 
 
 
12. Motherhood  
 
(found in 43% of all 
constitutions in 2010) 
 
Does the constitution provide 
special protection for 
mothers? 
 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
Do you think that a woman 
has to have children in order 
to be fulfilled or is this not 
necessary? 
 
0 Not necessary  
1 Needs children 
 
  
 
Some of the questions listed in Table 1 explicitly inquire about people’s values. 
They ask people about their position on homosexuality, abortion, marriage, and 
how much they value work or leisure time, for example. The more specific 
questions on whether women need children to be fulfilled, whether children need 
both a father and a mother, whether men have more right to a job than women, or 
whether people are willing to pay for increased environmental protection are also 
all questions about values. By contrast, the questions on whether people would be 
willing to strike, assemble, or petition less obviously capture values, but rather 
appear to capture cultural attitudes on whether people are willing to exercise these 
rights. Both popular values and cultural attitudes, however, potentially reveal 
important cross-country differences in national character that might be reflected in 
a country’s bill of rights. Both are therefore included in the analysis. 
In the empirical analysis that follows, the survey responses from the right 
column of Table 1 are in various ways linked to the corresponding rights from the 
left column of Table 1. To establish whether rights are connected to or 
disconnected from popular values, the analysis assesses (1) whether the rights that 
are included in the constitution indeed represent popular values and (2) whether the 
rights that are not included represent unpopular values. It is possible, however, that 
the inclusion and omission of rights are not valued in the same way by the people 
governed by a constitution. At least in theory, it is possible that someone deeply 
values the environment but does not want to enshrine a right to a healthy 
environment in the constitution. The questions from the World Values Survey do 
not capture this difference, as none of these questions explicitly enquire whether 
people would want to enshrine their values in their constitution. The possibility that 
the omission of important popular values from the constitution might nonetheless 
enjoy popular support will be explored in Part V, which presents the results from 
over a thousand survey responses that ask people whether they want their values 
enshrined in the constitution. The results from the survey suggest that people do 
generally want to enshrine their values in the constitution. 
III. EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS AND POPULAR VALUES 
Contrasting data on constitutional rights protection with data from the World 
Values Survey reveals that there exists only a weak relationship between 
constitutional choices and popular values. This statement finds support both in 
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simple descriptive explorations of how certain rights connect to popular values92 
and in multivariate regression analysis.93 
A. Cross-Country Descriptive Exploration 
A first glance at the data immediately reveals that constitutional choices are 
often divorced from popular views and values.94 For some constitutional rights, the 
connection appears illusive: countries whose people deeply value a right fail to 
adopt it, whereas countries whose people do not value the same right do adopt it. 
For other rights, the values they represent are almost universally endorsed across 
countries, but only some countries actually enshrine these rights in their 
constitutions. 
To illustrate a scenario where there is no apparent link between constitutional 
choices and popular values, consider the right to strike. In 2010, about 45% of the 
world’s constitutions included a right to strike. However, the inclusion of the right 
to strike often does not match the importance that people in these countries attach 
to this right. The constitutions of Morocco, Hungary, Romania, El Salvador, 
Belarus, Slovak Republic, Venezuela, Kyrgyz Republic, and the Philippines each 
contain a right to strike, although over 90% of the their populations (ranging from 
96% in Morocco to 91% in the Philippines) claimed that they would never, under 
any circumstance, participate in a legal strike. At the opposite extreme is the United 
Kingdom, where almost 100% of people surveyed are willing to engage in a legal 
strike, even though this right lacks constitutional status in British law.95 Other 
constitutions also omit the right, even though it is highly valued by the people. In 
South Korea, Sweden, and Denmark, over half of the population is willing to 
participate in a legal strike, but the right is omitted from the constitutional 
document. The left two columns in Table 2 list the five countries whose people’s 
values are most and least in line with the nation’s decision to include the right to 
strike in the constitution, while the right two columns list the five countries whose 
people’s values are most and least in line with the decision to omit the right from 
the nation’s founding document. 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. See Part III.A 
 93. See Part III.B 
 94. The World Values Survey data presented in this Part is based on the latest value for 
each country. For fifty-seven (out of ninety) countries, this data was collected in the last 
wave of data collection that took place between 2008 and 2010, while for the other countries 
it is based on the last available wave before 2008. 
 95. See supra note 6. 
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Table 2. The right to strike and popular values in 2010 
 
 
Right to strike included in constitution 
 
Right to strike not included in constitution 
 
        
Highest agreement 
(% that would go on 
a legal strike) 
 
Lowest agreement 
(% that would go 
on a legal strike) 
 
Highest agreement 
(% that would 
never go on a legal 
strike) 
 
Lowest agreement 
(% that would never 
go on a legal strike) 
 
 
 
Macedonia 
 
55% 
 
 
Morocco 
 
4% 
 
Pakistan 
 
98% 
United 
Kingdom 
 
 
 0% 
Croatia 50% Hungary 6% Egypt  97% Korea  36% 
Peru  45% Romania 7% Cyprus 97% Sweden  48% 
France  45% El Salvador 8% Jordan  96% Denmark 49% 
 
Azerbaijan 
 
41% 
 
Belarus 
 
8% 
 
Indonesia 
 
92% 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina  
 
56% 
 
 
As another example, consider the protection of the natural environment, which, 
in some form, is enshrined in about two-thirds of all constitutions in force today. In 
some countries, the natural environment receives constitutional protection even 
though the largest part of the population is not willing to pay for increased 
environmental protection. To illustrate, in Lithuania, Germany, Egypt, Estonia, 
Hungary, and others, more than two-thirds of the population oppose a tax increase 
to protect the environment, even though a healthy environment is enshrined in the 
constitution as one of the nation’s highest values. Conversely, the constitutions of 
the Dominican Republic, Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina omit 
the right, even though over two-thirds of the population values the environment so 
much that they would be willing to increase their taxes to protect it. Table 3 
summarizes the highest and lowest discrepancy between popular values and the 
right to a healthy environment among nations that include and exclude the right, 
respectively. 
 
Table 3. The right to a healthy environment and popular values in 2010 
 
 
Environmental protection  
included in constitution 
Environmental protection 
not included in constitution 
         
Highest Agreement 
(% willing to 
increase tax to protect 
environment) 
Lowest Agreement 
(% willing to 
increase tax to 
protect environment) 
Highest Agreement  
(% not willing to 
increase tax to 
protect environment) 
Lowest Agreement 
(% not willing to 
increase tax to protect 
environment) 
 
 
Vietnam 
 
91% 
 
 
Lithuania 
 
23% 
 
Austria 
 
63% 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
 
14% 
El Salvador 84% Germany 26% Morocco  61% Bangladesh  24% 
Turkey  78% Egypt 31% Ireland 60% Tanzania 25% 
 
Mali 
 
77% 
 
Estonia 
 
33% 
 
Jordan  
 
55% 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
 
30% 
Iran 77% Hungary 33% Singapore 55% Denmark 34% 
   
 
For a few constitutional provisions, the values they represent are almost 
universally endorsed across all countries. When such near-universally endorsed 
values make it into the constitution, the constitution aligns with popular opinion. 
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Yet in many cases, the constitution omits the relevant protections, thereby creating 
a dissonance between the written document and popular opinion. To illustrate, 
consider the right to get married. In 2010, about one-third of all constitutions 
protected marriage. In all these cases, more than two-thirds of the population 
disagreed with the statement that “marriage is an outdated institution,” revealing 
overwhelming popular support for the institution of marriage. Yet the same 
overwhelming support for marriage is also present in countries where the 
constitution omits protection. In the United States, for example, 88% of the 
population disagrees that marriage is outdated, yet marriage does not appear in the 
constitution. In fact, in every single country where the protection of marriage was 
omitted from the constitution, over half of the population continues to value this 
institution. 
 
Table 4. The right to get married and popular values in 2010 
 
 
Right to get married 
included in constitution 
Right to get married  
not included in constitution 
         
Highest Agreement 
(% that believes that 
marriage is not 
outdated) 
Lowest Agreement 
(% that believes that 
marriage is not 
outdated) 
Highest Agreement 
(% that believes 
that marriage is not 
outdated) 
Lowest Agreement 
(% that believes that 
marriage is outdated) 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
96% 
 
 
Spain 
 
68% 
Luxem-
bourg 
 
38% 
 
Pakistan 
 
 
1% 
Vietnam 92% Germany 71% France 35% Georgia  4% 
 
Ethiopia  
 
90% 
 
Switzerland 
 
72% 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
 
32% 
 
Egypt 
 
4% 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
89% 
United 
Kingdom 
 
73% 
 
Belgium 
 
31% 
 
Turkey 
 
5% 
Slovakia 88% Bulgaria 73% Austria 31% Bangladesh 5% 
   
 
The opposite scenario occurs for the right to equality regardless of sexual 
orientation. With only a few exceptions (notably, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Spain, Finland, Australia, 
and Germany), the majority of citizens in each country claims that homosexuality 
is unacceptable. Such disapproval is generally reflected in written constitutions, 
which only rarely protect homosexuality. In South Africa, which is one of the few 
countries to constitutionally protect homosexuality, the approval rate is very low: 
according to the World Values Survey, 82% of all South Africans deem 
homosexuality unacceptable today, while 88% deemed it unacceptable at the time 
the constitution was written.96 Conversely, the constitutions of the countries most 
accepting of homosexuality (the Netherlands and Sweden) do not actually include 
the right (although the Dutch parliament has recently been debating its inclusion).97 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. World Values Survey Ass’n, supra note 1. 
 97. Kamer Voor Seksuele Geaardheid in Artikel 1 Growndwet [Dutch Parliament 
Supports Inclusion of Equality Regardless of Sexual Orientation in Article 1 Constitution], 
TROUW, (Mar. 8, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4492/Nederland/article/ 
detail/3295998/2012/08/03/Kamer-voor-seksuele-geaardheid-in-artikel-1-grondwet.dhtml. 
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In most cases, constitutional omission of a protection for homosexuality is actually 
reflective of popular views and values. 
B. Regression Analysis 
To explore more systematically the seemingly weak relationship between 
popular values and constitutional choices, this Part turns to regression analysis. 
Regression analysis enables an exploration of whether, in comparative perspective, 
countries that attach a strong importance to certain values are more likely to 
enshrine those in their constitution than countries that attach lower importance to 
the same values. Of course, causal questions on the determinants of constitutional 
rights adoption in comparative perspectives are notoriously complex and difficult 
to resolve using common cross-country statistical techniques.98 To know that 
popular opinion affects the adoption of particular rights does not necessarily tell us 
whether popular opinion actually influences adoption or is merely correlated with 
it. For example, it is possible that popular opinion does not only affect 
constitution-making, but that the constitution also affects popular opinion in turn.99 
My research design does not account for the possibility of reversed causality, and 
all results should be interpreted with some caution. Nevertheless, even correlations 
can shed light upon the plausibility of certain hypotheses and inform subsequent 
interpretations as to why countries adopt certain rights.100 Conversely, the absence 
of any correlation between popular opinion and constitutional rights suggests that it 
is unlikely that they are related. 
To explore how popular values relate to constitutional choices, I estimate twelve 
regressions; one for each of the twelve values and corresponding rights described in 
the previous section. Specifically, I test (1) whether countries in which people 
adhere to traditional family values are more likely to protect the nuclear family in 
their constitution; (2) whether countries in which people consider leisure time 
important are more likely to adopt a right to leisure in their constitution; 
(3) whether countries in which people consider work to be very important are more 
likely to adopt a right to work in their constitution; (4) whether countries in which 
people value the environment even at the expense of their own income are more 
likely to protect the environment in their constitution; (5) whether countries in 
which people disagree that marriage is an outdated institution are more likely to 
enshrine a right to get married in their constitution; (6) whether countries in which 
people are willing to sign a petition are more likely to adopt the right to petition in 
their constitution; (7) whether countries in which people are more willing to 
lawfully assemble are more willing to enshrine a right to assembly in their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 82, at 919; Anne Meuwese & Mila Versteeg, 
Quantitative Methods for Comparative Constitutional Law, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW 230, 233 (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2012) (discussing the 
difficulty of distinguishing correlation from causation). 
 99. See Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY 3 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) (suggesting 
that, in theory, constitutional law may change popular opinion, but finding little empirical 
support for such a hypothesis in the United States). 
 100. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 82, at 919. 
2014] UNPOPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 1159 
 
constitution; (8) whether countries in which people are more willing to participate 
in a legal strike are more likely to enshrine a right to strike in their constitution; 
(9) whether countries in which people think homosexuality is justifiable are more 
likely to protect equality regardless of sexual orientation; (10) whether countries in 
which people agree that abortion is never justifiable are more likely to protect the 
right to life from the moment of conception; (11) whether countries in which 
people disagree that men are more entitled to jobs than women in times of job 
scarcity are more likely to enshrine gender equality in labor relations in their 
constitution; and (12) whether countries in which people believe that women need 
children to be fulfilled are more likely to protect motherhood. 
These relationships are explored in twelve separate probit regressions in which 
the presence of the relevant provision in the world’s constitutions is the dependent 
variable,101 and which each include the same control variables: (1) the country’s 
level of democracy, as measured numerically in the political science literature;102 
(2) the natural log of a country’s level of GDP per capita;103 (3) the 
comprehensiveness of the constitutional text, as measured by its total number of 
articles;104 (4) whether a country possesses a common law jurisdiction;105 (5) a set 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. Because constitutions tend to change infrequently, and the surveys that capture 
popular values are conducted only every few years, each model predicts constitutional rights 
adoption not from year to year, but from wave to wave of survey data collection, using the 
last year of each of the six waves of data collection that took place. Specifically, each of the 
twelve regression models combine the cross-sections for the years 1984, 1993, 1999, 2004, 
2006, and 2010, and calculate robust standard errors clustered at the country level, so that 
observations are allowed to be correlated over time. See The Integrated EVS/WVS 1981–
2008 Datafile, WORLD VALUES ASS’N, http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSIntegrated 
EVSWVS.jsp?Idioma=I (describing when each of the waves of data collection took place). 
As a robustness check, I also repeated the same model when observing each country at five-
year intervals in 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2010. When doing so, the results 
are almost the same as those reported below. 
  To further explore whether my findings depend on model specification, I repeated 
all the specifications reported in Table 6 when adding (1) a lagged version of the dependent 
variable as a predictor variable, and again repeated them when adding (2) a series of binary 
variables that control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries, also known as “fixed 
effects,” while estimating a linear probability model instead of a probit model. For both 
these models, the results are largely similar to those reported in Table 6. Moreover, I 
estimated a set of cross-sectional regressions for the years 1990, 2000, and 2010. When 
doing so, results were again largely similar to those reported in Table 6. 
 102. My measure of a country’s level of democracy is the “polity2” variable from the 
Polity IV data set, which is widely used by political scientists. This variable ranges from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). See Monty G. Marshall & Keith Jaggers, 
Polity IV Project: Dataset User’s Manual (Oct. 24, 2007), http://home.bi.no/a0110709/ 
PolityIV_manual.pdf. 
 103. My measure of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita comes from WORLD BANK, 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2011 (2011). 
 104. The measure of the total number of articles in the constitution is based on my own 
coding of all written constitutions. See supra Part III (describing the constitutions data). 
 105. I adopted the definition of “common law” countries used by Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Quality of Government, 
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999). 
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of binary variables for each period in which people were polled about their opinion, 
also known as time fixed-effects; and, finally, (6) three regional variables, 
capturing whether a country is located in Africa, Western Europe and North 
America, or in Asia, respectively.106 
Each of these variables has been theorized as important predictors of 
constitutional design choices in the existing literature. Existing research suggests 
that democracy is correlated with the adoption of negative liberty and judicial 
process rights.107 Economic wealth, by contrast, might plausibly predict whether 
countries adopt expensive socioeconomic rights, such as the right to work or the 
right to leisure. Intuitively, wealthier countries would seem more likely to adopt 
socioeconomic rights because they possess the resources to uphold them in 
practice. Yet the opposite scenario is also possible: poorer countries may adopt 
such rights as aspirations for the future.108 The specificity of the constitutional text 
may determine whether constitutional designers grant certain values constitutional 
status in the first place. Specifically, it turns out that there exist important 
differences in how ambitious any given constitution is: some merely enshrine a 
bare minimum of rights, while others set out elaborate policies.109 The common law 
system may also affect whether certain rights are adopted in the first place. 
Specifically, the common law system has traditionally been associated with a 
tradition of a small state, which may increase the propensity of common law 
systems to adopt negative liberty rights and to omit positive socioeconomic 
rights.110 Finally, the probability of adopting rights is likely to increase with time, 
as there has been a global trend toward “rights creep”; that is, a growing number of 
countries adopting a growing number of rights.111 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. The region of Latin America and the Caribbean is omitted because it serves as the 
reference category for interpretation. 
 107. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1226 (documenting a positive correlation 
between democracy and a libertarian constitutional ideology). 
 108. See David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, Measuring Government Effort to 
Respect Economic and Social Human Rights: A Peer Benchmark, in ECONOMIC RIGHTS: 
CONCEPTUAL, MEASUREMENT, AND POLICY ISSUES 214, 215 (Shareen Hertel & Lanse 
Minkler eds., 2007) (observing that it is difficult for countries to improve their performance 
in the areas of economic and social rights in a measurable way without “getting richer”). 
 109. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1213–21 (describing constitutional 
comprehensiveness as one of the main dimensions along which constitutions vary). 
 110. See 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF 
THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 94 (1978) (noting that 
negative liberties “have flourished chiefly among people where, at least for long periods, 
judge-made law predominated”); Paul Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: 
Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 506 (2001) (finding empirical evidence of a 
positive relationship between use of a common law system and economic growth, and 
attributing this relationship at least partly to the “greater judicial protection of property and 
contract rights from executive interference” that characterizes common law systems); La 
Porta et al., supra note 105 (finding that common law countries exhibit greater respect for 
political rights than countries of other legal origins). 
 111. Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1194 (documenting the phenomenon of “rights 
creep”). 
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Table 5 presents the regression outputs. The overarching impression from the 
regressions is that there exists generally no connection between popular values and 
constitutional choices. In most cases, the marginal effects for popular values are 
close to zero, while in other cases, they are even negative. In all but one case, they 
are statistically insignificant. The sole exception is the values on abortion, which 
are positively correlated with the constitutional protection of the unborn, albeit only 
statistically significant at the 10% confidence level. 
The lack of connection between popular values and the constitution raises the 
question of what factors—if not values—explain cross-country differences in 
constitutional choices. As it turns out, some of the control variables are statistically 
significantly correlated with constitutional choices, although their impact depends 
on the constitutional right at issue. As expected, a common law tradition is 
negatively correlated with socioeconomic and group rights; countries within this 
tradition are less likely to protect the family, rest, work, a healthy environment, 
strike, gender equality in labor relationships, and motherhood.112 It is also no 
surprise that the comprehensiveness of a constitution is correlated with some rights 
that are relatively uncommon in the world’s constitutions, such as the protection of 
the environment, the freedom of petition, gender equality in labor relationships, and 
a protection of motherhood.113 Thus, in these cases, it is the wide-ranging scope of 
the document as a whole that explains the adoption of these rights, not popular 
opinion. More counterintuitive is that democracy is positively correlated with the 
constitutional adoption of the right to rest, the protection of the environment, the 
protection of the unborn, but not with any other rights. Finally, economic wealth is 
negatively correlated with constitutional protection of the right to rest and petition, 
as well as the protection of the family, environment, and motherhood. This 
suggests that these rights are at least partly aspirational, as good working hours, a 
healthy environment, and the protection of the family and motherhood often remain 
elusive in poorer countries. While none of these findings should be interpreted as 
causal relationships, the overall impression from the regressions is that any given 
country’s constitutional choices are more a function of its regime type, its legal 
system, and the constitution’s overarching drafting style than the specific 
preferences and values of its people. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. Contrary to expectations, the common law tradition is also negatively correlated 
with the freedom of petition. 
 113. This finding is broadly consistent with findings from my earlier work, which singled 
out some of these rights as “esoteric rights,” which only appear in ambitious constitutions 
that protect a large number of rights. Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1217 tbl.3. 
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IV. WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE POPULIST CONSTITUTIONS? 
In comparative perspective, there appears to be little evidence that nations that 
deeply value certain rights are more likely to enshrine these rights in their 
constitutions than countries whose people attach less value to these same rights. 
The preceding analysis, however, provides little insight into the degree to which 
any given constitution reflects popular values. Even when cross-country differences 
in values do not explain cross-country differences in constitutional choices, some 
constitutions could still enjoy high levels of domestic support. This Part therefore 
explores to what degree each constitution aligns with popular values, and singles 
out the world’s most populist constitutions. 
A. A Ranking of Populist Constitutions 
To gauge whether written constitutions are generally reflective of popular values 
on the aforementioned twelve dimensions, I created a numerical populist 
constitution index that captures to what extent the constitutional choices of any 
given country reflect the values of its people. Specifically, the index captures the 
percentage of people in a country whose values align with how their constitution 
deals (or does not deal) with an issue, and then calculates the average country score 
across all twelve issues. When the constitution enshrines a right, the index captures 
the percentage of people who value this right, and when the constitution omits the 
right, the index captures the percentage of people who do not value this right.114 
The resulting index captures constitutional populism; that is, the extent to which 
any given constitution aligns with public opinion. To illustrate how the index is 
constructed, Table 6 lists its different components for South Africa in 2010. The 
South African Constitution, Table 6 suggests, is not very populist: on average 
across twelve issues its values align with the opinion of only 36% of the 
population. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. In constructing this index, the cut-offs to separate different groups of respondents 
from each other are the same as indicated in Table 1. 
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Table 6. Populist Constitution Score for South Africa in 2010 
 
 
 
Constitutional right 
 
 
Included in 
constitution? 
 
 
Corresponding value 
 
 
Populism 
score 
 
   
 
 
Freedom of petition 
 
 
Yes 
 
Percentage of people who would be willing to 
petition their government: 51% 
 
 
51% 
   
 
Right to assembly 
 
Yes 
 
Percentage of people who want to participate in 
a legal assembly: 50% 
 
50% 
   
 
Right to work 
 
Yes 
Percentage of people that consider work very 
important: 93% 
 
93% 
   
Protection of the 
environment 
 
Yes 
Percentage of people willing to pay for 
increased environmental protection: 46% 
 
46% 
   
 
Right to strike 
 
Yes 
Percentage of people willing to go on a legal 
strike: 18% 
 
18% 
   
Equality regardless 
of sexual 
orientation 
 
 
Yes 
 
Percentage of people who think homosexuality 
is acceptable: 18% 
 
 
18% 
   
 
Right to get married 
 
No 
Percentage of people who disagree that 
marriage is an outdated institution: 78% 
 
22% 
   
 
Protection of 
motherhood 
 
 
No 
Percentage of people that believe that women 
need to have children in order to be fulfilled: 
47% 
 
 
53% 
   
Right to life for the 
unborn (prohibition 
of abortion) 
 
 
No 
 
Percentage of people that consider abortion 
unacceptable: 84% 
 
 
16% 
   
Gender equality in labor 
(e.g., equal pay for 
equal work) 
 
 
No 
Percentage of people who believe that in times 
of job scarcity, men have more right to a job 
than a woman: 35% 
 
 
35% 
   
 
 
Protection of family life 
 
 
No 
Percentage of people with traditional family 
values (child needs both father and mother): 
90% 
 
 
10% 
   
 
Right to rest 
 
No 
Percentage of people that consider leisure time 
to be very important: 78% 
 
22% 
   
Populist Constitution Score 36% 
   
 
Table 7 lists the same scores for all countries in the years 2000 and 2010. The 
first and third columns list the countries in which popular support for the menu of 
rights in the constitutional document falls short of a majority; that is, the average 
popular agreement across the twelve issues falls short of 51%. In 2010, 44% of all 
countries fall in this category, including Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Canada, and the United States. The second and fourth columns of Table 7 
list the countries whose constitution does reflect the values of more than half of the 
population. In 2010, this was the case for 56% of all countries, including, but not 
limited to, the constitutions of China, Russia, and Sweden. 
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Constitutional scholars commonly believe that for a constitution to carry strong 
democratic legitimacy, it needs to be more democratic than ordinary legislation and 
needs support from a supermajority of all people.115 Figure 3 and Table 7 reveal that, 
among the world’s constitutions today, only in the constitutions of Macedonia, 
Guatemala, Italy, El Salvador, Uganda, Poland, and Ethiopia does the average right 
reflect the values of more than two-thirds of the population. Considering the alleged 
democratic legitimacy of constitutional texts,116 these numbers seem surprisingly low. 
 
Table 7. Populist Constitution Scores in 2000 and 2010 
 
 
2000 
_________________ 
2010 
_________________
 
Less than 51%  
of population 
______________________________________ 
 
More than 51%  
of population 
______________________________________ 
Less than 51%  
of population 
______________________________________ 
More than 51% 
of population 
______________________________________ 
Country % Country % Country % Country % 
    
New 
Zealand 
 
34 
 
Argentina 
 
52 
 
Singapore 
 
32 
 
Argentina 
 
52 
South 
Africa 
 
35 
 
Columbia 
 
52 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
 
33 
 
Finland 
 
52 
Australia 35 Hungary 52 Malaysia 33 Chile 52 
Canada 36 Finland 53 Australia 34 Zambia 53 
Denmark 37 France 54 South Africa 36 Sweden 54 
 
Iceland 
 
41 
Czech 
Republic 
 
54 
 
Canada 
 
37 
 
Romania 
 
54 
Norway 41 Ireland 54 New Zealand 37 South Korea 54 
United 
States 
 
44 
 
Egypt 
 
54 
 
Morocco 
 
37 
 
Egypt 
 
54 
Estonia 44 Slovenia 54 Denmark 37 Algeria 54 
United 
Kingdom 
 
44 
 
Latvia 
 
54 
 
Zimbabwe 
 
38 
 
Georgia 
 
55 
 
Taiwan 
 
45 
 
Uruguay 
 
55 
 
Norway 
 
42 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
55 
 
Japan 
 
45 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
55 
 
Cyprus 
 
42 
 
Mali 
 
55 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
 
46 
 
Lithuania 
 
55 
 
Iceland 
 
42 
 
Belarus 
 
55 
Sweden 46 Chile 55 Japan 43 Germany 56 
Bangladesh 48 Georgia 56 Estonia 44 Latvia 56 
India 48 Philippines 57 Taiwan 44 Mexico 56 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. See Karim Fahim & Mayy El Sheikh, First Round of Voting Spurs Dispute in Egypt, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012, at A13 (quoting one of the members of the Constitutional Assembly 
as saying that the new Egyptian Constitution would need a two-thirds majority to be legitimate). 
 116. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
2000 
_________________ 
2010 
_________________
 
Less than 51%  
of population 
______________________________________ 
 
More than 51%  
of population 
______________________________________ 
Less than 51%  
of population 
______________________________________ 
More than 51% 
of population 
______________________________________ 
Country % Country % Country % Country % 
    
 
Switzerland 
 
49 
 
Peru 
 
57 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
 
44 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
56 
Mexico 50 Spain 58 India 44 Ukraine 57 
Malta 50 Ukraine 58 Bangladesh 45 Moldova 57 
Austria 50 Romania 58 United States 45 Philippines 57 
Belgium 50 Germany 60 Tanzania 46 Spain 57 
Netherlands 51 Moldova 60 Jordan 46 Turkey 58 
 
Nigeria 
 
51 
 
South Korea 
 
60 
United 
Kingdom 
 
46 
 
Iraq 
 
58 
— — Portugal 60 Thailand 48 Greece 59 
 
— 
 
— 
 
Brazil 
 
61 
 
Netherlands 
 
49 
Slovak 
Republic 
 
59 
 
— 
 
— 
 
Armenia 
 
61 
 
Czech Republic 
 
49 
Russian 
Federation 
 
59 
— — Russian 
Federation 
 
61 
 
Austria 
 
49 
 
Croatia 
 
59 
— — Turkey 62 France 49 Bulgaria 60 
 
— 
 
— 
 
Belarus 
 
62 
 
Rwanda 
 
49 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
 
61 
— — Croatia 62 Malta 50 Albania 61 
— — Azerbaijan 62 Portugal 50 Peru 62 
— — Iran 62 Belgium 50 Luxembourg 62 
— —  
Luxembourg 
 
63 
 
Colombia 
 
50 
Burkina 
Faso 
 
62 
— — Venezuela 63 Ireland 50 Pakistan 62 
— — Bulgaria 63 Hungary 51 Indonesia 62 
— — Macedonia 64 Uruguay 51 China 62 
— — Slovak 
Republic 
 
64 
 
Slovenia 
 
51 
 
Armenia 
 
63 
— — Italy 66 Lithuania 51 Venezuela 63 
— — Poland 67 Nigeria 51 Ghana 63 
— — Greece 68 Switzerland 51 Brazil 65 
— — El Salvador 68 — — Vietnam 66 
— — Pakistan 69 — — Azerbaijan 66 
— — Albania 70 — — Iran 66 
— — China 73 — — Macedonia 67 
— — — — — — Guatemala 67 
— — — — — — Italy 67 
— — — — — — El Salvador 68 
— — — — — — Uganda 69 
— — — — — — Poland 69 
— — — — — — Ethiopia 76 
    
 
Note: The italicization denotes countries whose constitutional approval rating is higher than 66%. 
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B. Predictors of Constitutional Populism 
In 2010, the average Singaporean constitutional right accorded with the values 
of a mere 32% of Singaporeans, while the Ethiopian constitution’s rights provisions 
reflected, on average, the values of no fewer than 76% of Ethiopians. Why do some 
constitutions demonstrate fidelity to popular values while others do not? This 
sub-Part will provide an initial exploration of this question. 
Possible explanations for such cross-country variation may relate to (1) features 
of the constitution and (2) features of the nation. There are a number of 
constitutional features that are likely to relate to constitutional populism. First, the 
age of the constitution may affect the degree to which a constitution is connected to 
popular values. Specifically, older constitutions might be disconnected from 
popular values because they have failed to keep pace with evolving popular 
opinions over time. This is particularly intuitive for the United States, where, over 
its two-century history, the Constitution has seen relatively few formal 
amendments.117 Indeed, the relatively low populism score for the U.S. Constitution 
(of 45%) is likely the result of the document’s old age. At the same time, it is also 
possible that a constitution’s age is a less important predictor of its popularity than 
the U.S. experience would suggest. Foreign constitutions tend to be substantially 
younger than the venerable U.S. Constitution.118 Around the world, the average 
national constitution lasts only nineteen years before it is replaced altogether and is 
amended frequently in between.119 Indeed, it is striking that constitutions have 
lasted exactly as long as Thomas Jefferson said they should last when he famously 
argued that because “the earth belongs to the living,” the constitution should be 
updated every generation, which he defined as nineteen years.120 Because so many 
of the world’s constitutions were written or amended within the current generation, 
their disconnect from popular values is unlikely to be a product of their age alone. 
Second, it seems that constitutions adopted in a process involving popular 
participation are more likely to reflect substantive popular opinion. Where people 
are actively involved in constitution-making, they are likely to push for their own 
views and values.121 On the other hand, as hypothesized in Part II, procedural 
involvement does not automatically guarantee that constitutions will track popular 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the U.S. 
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 763, 765 (2012) (describing how the U.S. Constitution is 
unusual from a global perspective). 
 118. See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 129 (reporting that the “median survival time” 
of a constitution is nineteen years). 
 119. Id. at 129. 
 120. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958); (stating the self-evident proposition 
that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living”); id. at 393–94 (calculating that 18.8 years is 
the age of a generation, and concluding that “19 years is the term beyond which neither the 
representatives of a nation, nor even the whole nation itself assembled, can validly extend a 
debt”); id. at 396 (“Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires at the end of 
19[] years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not of right.”). 
 121. See supra Part I (discussing the relationship between popular participation and 
constitutions that substantively reflect popular values). 
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opinion, especially when popular involvement is limited to a yes-or-no vote in a 
referendum. Third, it seems plausible that if a constitution proclaims fidelity to 
popular values by enshrining the rhetoric of national identity and values in its 
preamble, its menu of rights might also match popular opinion.122 In that case, a 
genuine commitment to popular values is reflected both in the preamble and the bill 
of rights. Fourth, it is possible that constitutions that contain relatively few rights 
will enjoy lower levels of popular support than a constitution that contains 
numerous rights, because people generally favor an expansive catalogue of 
rights.123 
Country characteristics may also be associated with constitutional populism. 
First, it is possible that democratic countries produce constitutions that better 
reflect popular opinion. Second, perhaps economic welfare affects the degree to 
which constitutions are connected to popular values. Specifically, wealthier 
countries could be inherently more capable of honoring constitutional obligations, 
and their propensity to deliver those rights might make them more likely to promise 
them in the first place.124 Finally, the degree to which a country is willing and able 
to uphold its constitutional promises may affect the degree to which the 
constitution is connected to popular values. In particular, it is possible that 
constitutions that are closely connected to popular values are aspirational in nature; 
that is, they represent unfulfilled hopes for the future rather than rights that are 
upheld here and now.125 Likewise, regimes that have no intention of ever upholding 
the rights they promise might write documents that appeal to popular sentiments 
and, yet, are utterly meaningless in practice.126 In both cases, populist constitutions 
are most likely to be found among nations that do not uphold their constitutional 
promises in practice. 
Empirical exploration of what explains populist constitutions lends support to 
only some of these hypotheses.127 I used regression analysis to explore which 
variables correlate with constitutional populism. The predictor variables included in 
this regression are (1) the age of the constitution, measured by the number of years 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. See supra Part I (discussing how nations may pay fidelity to popular values by 
adopting a preamble packed with rhetoric on national values and identity). 
 123. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing how people usually vote in 
favor of more rights). 
 124. The empirical literature has repeatedly found that wealthy countries tend to possess 
superior human rights practices. See Gerald L. Blasi & David Louis Cingranelli, Do 
Constitutions and Institutions Help Protect Human Rights?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 223, 225–26 (Stuart S. Nagel & David Louis Cingranelli eds., 
1996) (summarizing the relevant literature). 
 125. See Michael Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1632 
(2009) (describing the concept of an “aspirational constitution”). 
 126. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 82, at 898–900 (documenting empirically that a 
substantial portion of the world’s constitutions are sham constitutions). 
 127. To be specific, I estimated an ordinary least squares regression model. To address 
serial correlation of the error terms, the model includes a lagged dependent variable and 
calculates robust standard errors clustered at the country level. I also re-estimated the same 
model when including country fixed-effects while excluding the lagged dependent variable, 
and the results are largely similar to those presented in Table 11. 
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since it was last revised or adopted;128 (2) whether or not the constitution was 
drafted with popular input, and specifically, whether it was ratified through a 
popular referendum;129 (3) whether a constitution signals populist commitments in 
its preamble by referring to the nation’s past;130 (4) whether a constitutional bill of 
rights is comprehensive and contains an expansive menu of rights;131 (5) whether a 
country is democratic;132 (6) the economic welfare of a country as measured by the 
natural log of its GDP per capita;133 and (7) the degree to which a constitution 
upholds its commitments.134 Table 8 summarizes the results from this empirical 
model.  
Given the difficulties surrounding causal inference in a cross-country setting, 
results from this analysis should not be interpreted as causal relationships. 
Nonetheless, the analysis reveals some interesting correlations. First, it appears that 
younger constitutions are more likely to be connected to popular values. Thus, 
when constitutions have not been amended for a while, they fall out of step with 
evolving popular opinion. Second, the sheer number of constitutional rights is also 
a statistically significant predictor of constitutional populism, which lends some 
credibility to the hypothesis that people typically favor including a comprehensive 
catalogue of rights. Thus, the more rights a document contains, the more closely it 
usually tracks popular opinion. Third, constitutional performance is also correlated 
with how populist constitutions are. Specifically, the more constitutional rights are 
upheld in reality, the less likely that the document will be populist in nature. This 
finding suggests that populist constitutions are mostly aspirational in character. 
Eritrea, for example, is the most populist constitution as of 2010, and yet, it only 
upholds a small fraction of its promises in practice.135 Finally, the analysis reveals a 
relationship between economic welfare and constitutional populism, specifically, 
that wealthier countries possess more populist constitutions. 
The other variables are not statistically significant predictors of constitutional 
populism. As it turns out, democracy is not statistically significantly correlated 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. By measuring constitutional age as the number of years since a constitution was last 
amended in any way (in the case of constitutions that have never been amended, the number 
of years since initial adoption), I seek to avoid the difficulties involved in attempting to 
distinguish between amendments that effectively rewrite a constitution and amendments that 
are relatively insubstantial. See Law & Versteeg supra note 80 (describing the difficulties in 
drawing such distinctions). 
 129. This variable is taken from the Comparative Constitutions Project. See supra note 
43 (introducing the data). I thank Justin Blount, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton for 
sharing this data. 
 130. This variable is based on my own coding of all of the world’s written constitutions. 
See supra Part I.A for an introduction and graphical representation. 
 131. This variable was taken from Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1266–68 
(describing how this variable was constructed from the constitutions of 188 countries written 
between 1946 and 2006). 
 132. See supra note 102 (describing the polity2 democracy variable). 
 133. See supra note 103 (describing the GDP variable). 
 134. Law & Versteeg, supra note 82, at 886 (introducing a numerical measure that 
captures the degree to which any government honors its constitutional commitments). 
 135. Id. at 898 (singling out the Eritrean Constitution as the second most “sham” 
constitution in 2010). 
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with constitutional populism. Thus, constitutions created by democracies are no 
more likely to substantively reflect popular values than are those created by 
autocracies. Populist rhetoric in the preamble is not statistically significantly 
related to constitutional populism in the bill of rights either. Perhaps most 
surprising is the finding that popular referendums do not produce more populist 
constitutions. Presumably this finding reflects that referendums allow only for 
limited popular input: a mere yes-or-no vote on the full package of proposed 
revisions.136 Procedural involvement, thus, is no guarantee that constitutions will 
substantively track popular views and values. At the same time, it is still possible 
that other types of involvement in the drafting stage do result in constitutions that 
substantively reflect popular values. Further research is required to explore the 
connection between procedural involvement and the content of the constitution 
itself. 
 
Table 8. Predictors of Constitutional Populism 
 
 
Age of the constitution -0.011*** 
Constitutional underperformance -1.376*** 
Comprehensiveness of constitution -0.442* 
Adopted by referendum  0.023 
References to history in preamble  0.258 
Democracy -0.004 
GDP per capita (natural log)  0.194** 
Lagged dependent variable  0.880*** 
 
R2 
 
 0.97 
N   913 
 
Note: Coefficients from OLS regression with lagged dependent variable *** denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% confidence level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 
5% confidence level, and * denotes statistical significance at the 10% confidence level. 
V. DO PEOPLE WANT THEIR CONSTITUTION TO BE POPULIST? 
The disconnect between constitutional choices and popular values is not in and 
of itself indicative of an unpopular constitutionalism. It is possible that people do 
not always want their constitutions to reflect all the principles that they value in 
life. For instance, perhaps some people who deeply value the environment do not 
want to enshrine a right to a healthy environment in their constitution; they might 
worry, for instance, that doing so would unduly increase the size of the government 
and would delegate too much power to the judiciary. The remainder of this Part 
will explore this possibility. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. See supra Part I.B (describing the limited participation in a popular referendum). 
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A. Unpopular Constitutionalism 
An exploration of whether people want their constitution to reflect their values 
requires new survey data. None of the World Values Survey questions inquire 
about the people’s views on their constitution, and to my knowledge, no such 
survey exists. To gauge whether what people want from life corresponds with what 
they want from their constitution, I designed my own survey on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. Mechanical Turk is an “online crowdsourcing system that allows 
users to distribute work to a large number of online respondents.”137 This work is 
broken down into simple one-time tasks for which respondents are paid to 
complete. Mechanical Turk is used for a wide variety of tasks, which increasingly 
includes survey research by social scientists.138 
The survey was available online from January 30 to April 15, 2013, and was 
completed by 1029 respondents from eleven countries, about half of whom were 
from the United States.139 The survey exactly replicated the questions from the 
World Values Survey,140 but for each question about values, it asked a follow-up 
question on whether the respondent would want to enshrine the same values in the 
constitution. For example, after asking whether the respondent finds homosexuality 
justifiable (using the same scoring as in the World Values Survey),141 the 
respondent would be asked whether he or she wants to include a protection of 
equality regardless of sexual orientation in the constitution.142 Mechanical Turk 
workers tend to fairly closely approximate a random sample of the population, but 
female workers and younger workers are somewhat overrepresented.143 For that 
reason, the survey also included questions that ask for the respondent’s age, gender, 
and political ideology, so that these features can be controlled for in the subsequent 
analysis. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. Joel Ross, Andrew Zaldivar, Lilly Irani, Bill Tomlinson & M. Six Silberman, Who 
Are the Crowdworkers? Shifting Demographics in Mechanical Turk, in CHI ’10 EXTENDED 
ABSTRACTS ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 2863, 2863–64 (2010) (describing 
the basic principles of Amazon’s crowd-sourced virtual workplace). 
 138. See, e.g., Michael Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, A New Source of Inexpensive Yet High-Quality Data?, 6 PERSP. ON 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1, 3 (2011) (suggesting that Mechanical Turk yields inexpensive but 
high-quality data for psychology researchers that is more demographically diverse that most 
internet surveys). 
 139. Specifically, the survey was taken by 522 people from the United States, 399 people 
from India, 51 people from Canada, 20 people from Pakistan, 12 from Germany, 10 from 
Australia, 5 from France, 4 from South Africa, 3 from Croatia, 2 from the Netherlands, and 1 
from Kenya. Depending on the country, respondents were paid between twenty-five cents and 
one dollar to complete the survey. 
 140. See supra Table 1. 
 141. See supra Table 1. 
 142. On average, people spent 3.8 minutes on the survey. Respondents that took less than 
60 seconds to complete the survey were omitted from the analysis. 
 143. Ross et al., supra note 137, at 2865 (suggesting that the workers on Mechanical 
Turk are diverse and closely resemble the population as a whole, but that the workforce is 
disproportionately made up of female and younger people). 
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Of course, the survey does not provide a fully accurate description on the 
constitutional opinions of the world population at large. Even if the sample were 
fully random, the sample size is not large enough to draw such inferences. 
Sampling the world population at large would require an undertaking of the 
magnitude of the World Values Survey, with a global network of social 
scientists.144 The purpose of the survey presented in this sub-Part is more modest. 
Its goal is merely to provide a first sense of whether people typically want their 
values enshrined in their constitution, or whether they are reluctant to demand 
some of the rights that they value in the abstract. Further research will be required 
to provide a more definite answer to this question. 
The main impression from the surveys is that, overwhelmingly, people do want 
to enshrine their values in the constitution. Table 9 lists for each survey question 
the percentage of respondents that deeply value a certain right, as well as the 
percentage of respondents that deeply value the right and want to enshrine it in 
their constitution. The table reveals that, in most cases, people who value a right 
also want to enshrine it in their constitution: 90% of those who hold traditional 
family values want to protect the family in their constitution; 91% of those who 
value gender equality want the constitution to protect gender equality in labor; 84% 
of those who value the environment want environmental protection in their 
constitution; 92% of those willing to engage in a legal assembly want to enshrine a 
right to assembly in their constitution; 88% of those who think homosexuality is 
justifiable want gay rights included in their constitution; and 89% of those who 
value motherhood want to enshrine a protection of motherhood in the constitution. 
The smallest congruity lies in the right to rest; only 54% of those who believe that 
leisure time is important think that a right to rest should be constitutionalized. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. See supra Part III (describing the World Values Survey data). 
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Table 9. Proportion of people that value a right and also want to enshrine it in the 
constitution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Right 
 
 
 
Percentage of 
respondents that 
value the right 
 
Percentage who 
values the right 
and want to 
enshrine it in 
their constitution 
 
 
Protection of the family (percentage of respondents 
with traditional family values) 
 
679/1007 (67%) 
 
608/679 (90%) 
 
Right to rest (percentage of respondents that considers 
leisure time to be very important) 
 
945/1014 (93%) 
 
519/954 (54%) 
 
Right to work (percentage of people that considers 
work very important) 
 
902/1013 (89%) 
 
664/902 (74%) 
 
Right to healthy environment (percentage of people 
willing to pay for increased environmental 
protection) 
 
 
683/1008 (68%) 
 
 
576/683 (84%) 
Right to get married (percentage of people who 
disagree that marriage is an outdated institution) 
 
748/1015 (74%) 
 
535/748 (72%) 
 
Right to petition (percentage of people who would be 
willing to petition their government) 
 
910/1017 (89%) 
 
776/910 (85%) 
 
Right to assembly (percentage of people who want to 
participate in a legal assembly) 
 
860/1016 (85%) 
 
788/860 (92%) 
 
Right to strike (percentage of people willing to go on a 
legal strike) 
 
675/1014 (67%) 
 
545/675 (81%) 
 
Equality regardless of sexual orientation (percentage of 
people who thinks homosexuality is acceptable) 
 
564/1013 (56%) 
 
499/564 (88%) 
 
Right to life for unborn (percentage of people that 
considers abortion unacceptable) 
 
525/1025 (51%) 
 
376/525 (72%) 
 
Gender equality in labor (percentage of people who do 
not believe that in times of job scarcity, men have 
more right to a job than women) 
 
 
778/1018 (76%) 
 
 
705/778 (91%) 
 
Protection of motherhood (percentage of people that 
believe that women need to have children in order  
to be fulfilled) 
 
 
349/1009 (35%) 
 
 
309/349 (89%) 
 
 
When exploring these same relationships in twelve separate regressionsin 
which respondents’ willingness to enshrine each of the twelve rights in their 
constitution are the dependent variablesa similar impression emerges. Each of 
these regressions include the following predictor variables: (1) whether the 
respondent finds the values that correspond with the right very important; (2) the 
respondent’s age; (3) the respondent’s gender; (4) the respondent’s self-proclaimed 
political ideology (progressive or conservative); and (5) whether the respondent was 
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based in the United States.145 The results (presented in Table 10) reveal that, with the 
sole exception of gender equality in labor relations, people who deeply value a right 
also prefer that their constitution protects that right. These findings are statistically 
significant even when controlling for attributes like age, gender, political ideology, 
and geographical location. When combined with the findings from the previous Part, 
these findings suggest that constitutions are not only detached from popular values, 
but that this disconnect is unsupported by popular opinion. As a result, the global 
practice of constitution-making appears to be characterized by unpopular 
constitutionalism. 
Of course, the surveys were not completed under the conditions of a constitutional 
moment, in which the people transcend their ordinary shortsighted self-interest and 
pay fidelity to the common good.146 In theory, it is possible that respondents would 
feel differently when they are actually writing a constitution, in such a constitutional 
moment of heightened deliberation. Indeed, in theory, this could even explain why 
constitutions ratified through popular referendum do not reflect popular values: 
because the people change their values when writing a constitution. Though the 
constitutional moment is a powerful construct in constitutional theory, there is little 
evidence that real-world constitutions are written under such conditions.147 In fact, 
the prevailing evidence suggests the opposite: constitutions are commonly written by 
experts, self-interested elites,148 imposed by outsiders,149 and copied and pasted from 
elsewhere.150 Even in the rare cases in which constitutional moments occur, it is 
unlikely that people will set aside their values on contested moral issues such as 
abortion or gay rights. In the absence of any evidence that people change their views 
at times of constitution-making, the survey data presented in this Article suggests that 
the global practice of constitution-making is characterized by an unpopular 
constitutionalism.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. Specifically, I estimated an ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level. 
 146. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.  
 147. See Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce 
Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Moments 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 764, 776–92 (1992) (noting 
that “Ackerman assumes rather than demonstrates the existence of constitutional moments” and 
showing, based on historical research, the American Founding was not free of political 
self-interest); András Sajó, Constitution without the Constitutional Moment: View from the New 
Member States, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 243, 243 (2005) (noting that the constitutions of the United 
States, Belgium, and maybe post-apartheid South Africa were written during a constitutional 
moment, but that the “overwhelming majority” of constitutions were not). 
 148. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM passim (2004) (describing constitution-making as a product of 
“self-preservation” by hegemonic elites). 
 149. See generally Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Baghdad, Tokyo, 
Kabul . . . : Constitution Making in Occupied States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1139 (2008). 
 150. See Goderis & Versteeg, supra note 82 (describing constitutional imposition in over 
thirty former British colonies in Africa and the Caribbean as well as in Japan, Micronesia, 
Germany, Afghanistan, Iraq, and others). 
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B. An Unpopular U.S. Constitution? 
Americans might be different. The survey responses reveal a striking difference 
between respondents in the United States and those in other countries. Unlike their 
foreign counterparts, Americans tend not to want all of their personal values 
constitutionalized, specifically those that are positive or socioeconomic in nature. While 
much has been said about American exceptionalism in the constitutional realm,151 the 
survey results tentatively suggest that one of the most exceptional traits of U.S. 
constitutional lawthe distinctly libertarian character of the Federal U.S. 
Constitution152in fact appears to be supported by popular opinion.153 
This contrast between Americans and foreign respondents is apparent from the 
regression results reported in Table 10. Specifically, compared with foreign 
respondentsand controlling for attributes like age, gender, ideology as well as how 
much respondents value each right in the abstractAmericans are systematically less 
likely to demand constitutional protections for the family, a right to rest, a right to work, 
a right to a healthy environment, a protection of marriage, rights for the unborn, gender 
equality in labor relations, and a protection of motherhood. 
The finding raises the possibility that Americans do not want to constitutionalize all 
of their values, and invites a reconsideration of the populist constitution score for the 
U.S. Constitution presented in Part V.A of this Article. Specifically, to gauge the true 
popularity of the U.S. Constitution, it might be more insightful to consider which rights 
Americans actually want in their constitution, rather than to what extent each right aligns 
with their personal beliefs. In other words, we will have to consider Americans’ 
constitutional values rather than their personal values. To facilitate such an analysis, 
Table 11 presents, for each right included in the analysis, (1) the percentage of 
Americans that values the right and (2) the percentage of Americans that actually want 
the right in their constitution. These numbers are based on the Mechanical Turk survey 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. See generally AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 65 
(describing how the United States is a global outlier in free speech, the death penalty, and 
socioeconomic rights, amongst other things). 
 152. See HARTZ, supra note 79, at 6 (explaining the distinctly libertarian constitutional 
tradition of the United States); EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: 
WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 12 (2013) (noting that the 
conventional wisdom about the American constitutional tradition is that “protective and 
redistributive policies are questions of majoritarian choice, not matters of constitutional duty”); 
Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 46 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (“American distrust of government is a 
contributing factor to a strongly libertarian approach to constitutional rights. The Constitution of 
the United States is a strongly negative constitution, and viewing the constitution as the vehicle 
for social rights, community rights, or positive citizen entitlements of any kind is . . . highly 
disfavored.”); Dieter Grimm, The Protective Function of the State, in EUROPEAN AND U.S. 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 77, at 119 (noting that negative rights characterize the U.S. 
constitutional tradition and attributing this to America’s lack of feudalism). 
 153. Cf. Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism 
Revisited (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (showing empirically that 
many U.S. state constitutions do include socioeconomic rights). 
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conducted by the author, while the World Values Survey numbers are listed for 
comparison.154 
The table reveals that there exists some discrepancy between the degree to which 
Americans value rights in the abstract, and whether they want to enshrine these in the 
Constitution. To illustrate, 90% and 87% of American respondents value leisure time 
and work, respectively, but only 35% of all Americans want a right to rest or leisure in 
the Constitution and only 57% would want a constitutional right to work.155 When 
recalculating the U.S. populism score based on Americans’ constitutional values rather 
than their personal values (the percentage of people that want or do not want each right 
in the Constitution, rather than the percentage that value or do not value the right in the 
abstract), the average support for the menu of rights enshrined in the U.S. Constitution 
increases somewhat: 48% of Americans get the rights they wanted. 
Even though Americans agree with the omission of some rights from the 
Constitution, they disagree with the omission of others. Specifically, the survey reveals 
that there are high levels of popular support for some rights that are omitted from the text 
of the U.S. Constitution156. Specifically, 88% of respondents want to enshrine a 
protection for gender equality in labor relations; 77% want to enshrine gay rights; 70% 
of respondents want a right to strike in the constitution; and 62% would want a 
constitutional right to a healthy environment. It is these types of omissions that decrease 
the popularity of the U.S. Constitution and make the average provision included in the 
analysis fall short of a majority. 
Another difference between the United States and foreign countries is that many 
rights that are protected under U.S. constitutional law are not explicitly enshrined in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. In general, the results from the Mechanical Turk survey are fairly similar to the results 
from the World Values Survey. Note that with a fully random sample, and a survey size of 522 
American respondents, there would have been a margin of error of 4.3%. See Sample Size 
Calculator, SURV. SYS., http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm. As can be seen, for a number 
of rights, the difference between the Mechanical Turk Survey and the WVS survey data falls 
within the margin of error, but for others, it does not. One possible cause for the discrepancy is 
that the last wave of WVS data collection in the United States took place in 2006, and values 
might have changed since then. Another possible cause is that my sample of Mechanical Turk 
workers is not fully random; this is why the regression analysis controls for attributes such as 
ideology age and gender. To illustrate how both of these effects might be at work, consider the 
data on gay rights, for which the discrepancy between the WVS findings and the finding from my 
survey is largest. According to the World Values Survey, 70% of Americans think that 
homosexuality is unacceptable, while according to the Mechanical Turk survey only 27% thinks 
that homosexuality is unacceptable. This difference may reflect a sample selection bias, since the 
younger Mechanical Turk workers are more likely to be supportive of gay rights. Yet it is also 
possible that the discrepancy results from rapidly changing values on gay rights in America. See 
David A. Fahrenthold & Jon Cohen, Record Support for Gay Marriage, WASH. POST, March 19, 
2013, at A1 (documenting that 41% of Americans supported gay marriage in 2004, 36% 
supported gay marriage in 2006, and 58% supported gay marriage in 2013). In fact, the 73% 
support measured in my survey is larger than both the 58% in the Washington Post survey and the 
30% support measured by the World Values Survey in 2006. 
 155. Among the 90% of Americans that deeply value leisure time, 36% want to enshrine a 
right to leisure in the Constitution; among the 82% of Americans that deeply value work, 59% 
wants to enshrine a right to work in the Constitution. 
 156. See Table 10. 
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Constitution itself but have been created through judicial interpretations. The 
U.S. Constitution has seen relatively few formal amendments, but it is updated almost 
daily through judicial interpretation.157 In contrast with the venerable U.S. Constitution, 
foreign constitutions tend to be both younger and substantially more detailed,158 thereby 
leaving less time and discretion for foreign courts to update their constitutional 
documents. As a result, most countries’ constitutional texts are more important to their 
respective systems than is the United States’. Indeed, the gap between the written “large-
C” constitution and the broader body of constitutional lawor the nation’s “small-c” 
constitutionis larger in the United States than in any other foreign country.159 
Three of the rights that feature in the analysis have arguably been recognized by the 
Supreme Court, even though they are not explicitly enshrined in the Constitution. These 
are the right to get married, the protection of gender equality in labor relations, and, as of 
very recently, gay rights.160 In these cases, the Supreme Court has updated the 
Constitution to more closely conform to popular opinion. Indeed, according to some 
commentators, constitutional interpretation is never immune from popular opinion.161 
Professor Leider, for example, has shown that the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment 
jurisprudence has always tracked evolving popular opinion and reflects a desire on the 
part of the court to “accommodate a population divided between those believing in the 
right and those seeking stronger restrictions on weapons.”162 The recent overturning of 
the Defense of Marriage Act might reflect a similar desire. According to the Mechanical 
Turk survey, which was conducted right before the Supreme Court decided United 
States v. Windsor,163 78% of Americans support a constitutional protection of equality 
regardless of sexual orientation.164 By deciding the case the way it did, the Supreme 
Court thus brought the Constitution further in line with popular values. 
When taking into account that these rights are in fact protected in the larger body of 
constitutional law, the popularity score of the U.S. Constitution changes from 48% to 
60%. In other words, between the constitutional text and judicial interpretations, U.S. 
constitutional law grants a majority of 60% of Americans the rights they want. Thus, 
when considering Americans’ distinct constitutional values as well as the interpretations 
by the Supreme Court, the U.S. constitutional system is closer to popular opinion than it 
appears at first sight. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 129 (reporting that the median survival time of 
the world’s constitutions is nineteen years). 
 158. See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 153 (describing empirically how the U.S. 
constitution is unusually brief and stable by global standards). 
 159. Id. at 25 (noting that the U.S. Constitution is the oldest national constitution in the 
world, and among the four briefest democratic constitutions in existance, and observing that 
this entails an unusual delegation of constitution-making authority to the judiciary). 
 160. To determine whether each of the twelve rights covered in my analysis are 
recognized in constitutional law, I rely on the quantitative coding by Kevin L. Cope, who 
coded the presence of 112 rights in U.S. constitutional law. See Kevin L. Cope, The Global 
Relevance of U.S. Constitutional Law (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(describing the cases in which the Supreme Court recognized a protection of marriage and a 
prohibition of gender discrimination in labor by the government). 
 161. See supra note 30. 
 162. Leider, supra note 30, at 3. 
 163. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 164. See supra note 154 (discussing potential selection bias in my survey). 
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Table 11. Personal and Constitutional Values for American Respondents 
 
 Right Included 
_________________________________________________
 
 Right corresponds  
with personal values 
 
Right corresponds  
with constitutional values 
 
  
Right to Petition People who would be willing to 
petition their government: 94% 
(95% WVS) 
People who want a right to petition in 
their constitution: 83% 
  
Right to 
Assembly 
People who want to participate in a 
legal assembly: 83% (69% WVS) 
People who want a right to assembly in 
their constitution: 92% 
 
 Right Not Included 
_________________________________________________
 
 Right does not correspond  
with personal values 
 
Right does not correspond  
with constitutional values 
 
  
Protection of 
Family  
People who do not have traditional 
family values: 52% (36% WVS) 
People who do not want a right a 
protection of family life in the 
constitution: 33% 
Right to Rest People who do not consider leisure 
time to be very important: 10% 
(11% WVS) 
People who do not want a right to rest 
in the constitution: 65% 
Right to Work People who do not consider work 
very important: 17 % (20% WVS) 
People who do not want a right to 
work in the constitution: 43% 
Right to 
Environment 
People who do not value the 
environment : 39% (49% WVS) 
People who do not want a right to 
healthy environment in the 
constitution: 38% 
Right to 
Marriage 
People who agree that marriage is 
an outdated institution: 30% (12% 
WVS) 
People who do not want a right to get 
married in the constitution: 45% 
Right to Strike People who are not willing to go 
on a legal strike: 33% (56% WVS) 
People who do not want a right to 
strike in the constitution: 30% 
Gay Rights People who do not think 
homosexuality is acceptable: 27% 
(70% WVS) 
People who do not want gay rights in 
the constitution: 23% 
Rights for 
Unborn 
People that consider abortion 
acceptable: 58% (31% WVS) 
People who do not want a right to life 
for unborn in the constitution: 65% 
Gender equality People who do not value gender 
equality in labor : 5% (7% WVS) 
People who do not want a right to 
gender equality in labor relations in the 
constitution: 12% 
Protection of 
motherhood 
 
People who do not believe that 
women need to have children in 
order to be fulfilled: 92% (86% 
WVS) 
People who do not want a protection of 
motherhood in the constitution: 48% 
  
 
 
Total 
Americans whose personal values 
align with constitution: 44% (45% 
WVS) 
Americans whose constitutional values 
align with constitution: 48% 
 
N = 522 
 
  
 
Note: The italicization in the first column denotes the rights not explicitly enumerated in the 
Constitution, but that are nonetheless protected under U.S. constitutional law. 
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VI. POSSIBLE CAUSES OF UNPOPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
In constitutional theory, as well as popular imagination, constitutions are widely 
regarded as distinct expressions of popular views and values.165 The findings from 
this Article suggest that it might be necessary to re-evaluate this idea. Although the 
findings should be interpreted with some caution, all the available evidence 
suggests that constitutions are mostly disconnected from popular values, even in 
democratic countries and in countries where the document was ratified through a 
popular referendum. This Part sets forth a possible explanation for why unpopular 
constitutionalism appears to prevail in so many countries around the world. 
To understand the disconnect, it is important to note that constitutions are not 
usually written by the people as a whole. Most of the time, they tend to be drafted 
by small groups of experts who are consulted by international organizations as well 
as special interest groups, mainly in the form of national and international 
nongovernmental organizations.166 Only after a draft has been agreed upon, it is 
deliberated by democratically elected bodies and/or put to the people for 
ratification. Moreover, in the majority of cases, popular approval is still not sought 
at all.167 Thus, the experts that write the constitutions often do so in relative 
insulation from democratic pressures. And in designing the nation’s highest 
document, these experts do not merely consider majoritarian sentiments but 
balance these against a host of competing considerations that might contradict the 
goal of popular self-expression. 
Assuming that the constitution-drafters do not simply seek to enshrine their own 
preferences and values but think about the greater good, there exist two important 
considerations compete with the desire to express popular views and values. These 
competing considerations are functionalism and universalism. Universalism holds 
that all constitutions should enshrine certain universal valuesmost notably 
relating to rightsregardless of the wishes of the majority. Universalist 
considerations caution constitutional designers against popular self-expression 
because populist constitutions potentially undermine universal human rights 
norms.168 Functionalism counsels against populist constitutions because those 
documents are more likely to be technically unsound: for example, they often 
enshrine an overly broad catalogue of rights.169 Both functionalism and 
universalism, then, are possible causes of unpopular constitutionalism. 
A. Functionalism 
For real-world constitution-makers, constitutions are not merely forums to 
express popular values; they also represent an opportunity to design the nation and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra Part II.B (describing the recent trend towards popular participation, and 
noting that 34% of constitutions currently in force require ratification through a popular 
referendum). 
 168. See infra Part VI.B. 
 169. See infra Part VI.A. 
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to strategically achieve certain goals.170 From a functionalist perspective, the 
constitution is less the “soul of the nation” than it is the country’s operating 
system.171 To perform well, both a country and a computer need a technically 
superior operating system. Constitutions, then, are ideally like Windows 8 or 
Apple’s Mountain Lion, and constitution-makers are engineers with the technical 
expertise to find optimal constitutional solutions.172 Through constitutional design, 
constitutions can promote desirable goals such as economic welfare,173 a lasting 
respect for rights and liberty,174 stable democracy,175 and the mitigation of conflict 
in divided societies.176 
Under the logic of functional constitutional design, constitutionalism implies a 
set of substantive constitutional principles to which designers must adhere if they 
are to achieve a well-functioning government. Such principles tend to be 
standardized and do not usually depend on context.177 As Professor Tom Ginsburg 
explains, constitution-making often starts with “boilerplate” constitutional 
provisions that represent easily available and technically sound solutions for 
constitutional design.178 Instead of starting from scratch, constitution-makers draw 
on available boilerplates. To return to the computer analogy, it might be foolish to 
design a new operating system from whole cloth if Windows 8 or Apple’s 
Mountain Lion were already available. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 34, at 68, 72 (suggesting that a functionalist approach 
is promoted by political scientists who seek to identify the best constitutional solutions). See 
generally ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2000). 
 171. E.g., Kreimer, supra note 13, at 641–44 (contrasting the notion that the constitution 
is “the soul of the nation” with the idea that constitutions serve as nations’ operating 
systems).  
 172. On the “science” of constitutional design, see DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (2006); Ran Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and Constitutional 
“Success,” 87 TEX. L. REV 1339 (2009). 
 173. For the view that constitutions promote economic welfare, see, for example, 
COOTER, supra note 170; TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO TABELLINI, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
CONSTITUTIONS (2003). 
 174. For the view that bills of rights promote liberty, see, for example, PROMOTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Philip Alston ed., 
1999). 
 175. For the view that constitutions can design democracy, see, for example, CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO (2001). 
 176. For the view that constitutions can mitigate conflict in divided societies, see, for 
example, CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETY: INTEGRATION OR 
ACCOMMODATION? (Sujit Choudhrey ed., 2008); Donald L. Horowitz, Conciliatory 
Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1213 (2008); Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 
96 (2004). 
 177. See Peter C. Ordeshook, Are ‘Western’ Constitutions Relevant to Anything Other 
than the Countries They Serve?, 13 CONST. POL. ECON. 3, 3 (2002) (“There necessarily exists 
universal principles of democratic constitutional design, even if those principles remain 
largely undiscovered.”). 
 178. Tom Ginsburg, Constitutions as Contract, Constitutions as Charters, in THE SOCIAL 
AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 182, 196 (describing 
boilerplate constitutional provisions). 
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Functionalism appears to be a common sentiment in constitution-making.179 The 
U.S. Constitution, for example, was carefully engineered by its drafters, who had 
extensively studied the available insights from political science and constitutional 
experiences elsewhere. In the same spirit, the drafters of the 1922 Irish Free State 
Constitution did a “diligent search” of numerous foreign constitutions, which were 
carefully studied to get new insights on how to best “engineer” Irish society.180 
Most recently, the 2011 South Sudanese Constitution was written under the 
auspices of a cadre of foreign consultants who advised the South Sudanese drafters 
on the wisdom of their proposed choices.181 Functional constitutional design is thus 
akin to a science, as part of which experts prescribe optimal constitutional solutions 
to each nation.182 Such functional recipes for constitutional design, however, are 
likely to be disconnected from popular opinion. 
B. Universalism 
Real-world constitution-makers do not merely balance the demands of 
democratic constitutional theory against functional considerations, but also against 
universalism: the belief that some values are so important that they should be 
enshrined in constitutions everywhere.183 From a universalist viewpoint, all 
constitutions are to contain certain universal rights norms, regardless of popular 
opinion.184 
A body of sociological research has demonstrated that the international 
community is increasingly characterized by standardized models of statehood.185 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, Transnational Constitutionalism: A Conceptual 
Framework, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, 
at 103 (documenting widespread borrowing in constitution-making around the globe, from 
nineteenth century Latin America, to post-colonial Africa, to Iceland, and South Sudan 
today). 
 180. Paul Brady, Social, Political and Philosophical Foundations of the Irish 
Constitutional Order, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 24, at 269, 274. 
 181. See Cope, supra note 34, at 304 (describing the cadre of foreign experts involved in 
the drafting of the 2011 South Sudanese Transitional Constitution, ranging from the National 
Democratic Institute, the Max Planck Institute, to the American law firm Latham & 
Watkins). 
 182. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 13, at 265 (noting that constitution-making involves 
“consultations with (if not management by) international actors (governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations), concerning constitutional design (including voting 
systems), constitutional rights, and constitutional enforcement mechanisms”); Jed 
Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 
1992–93 (2004) (describing the prevalence of “international constitutions” that are primarily 
drafted by foreign consultants). 
 183. Tushnet, supra note 34, at 67, 69 (describing normative universalism as the idea that 
the same universal values apply everywhere). 
 184. Id. at 69 (“Normative universalism emerges primarily from the dialogue between 
those who study comparative constitutional law and those who study international human 
rights.”). 
 185. See John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas & Francisco O. Ramirez, World 
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Especially in the area of human rights, there now exists an internationally defined 
human rights paradigm that has equipped the international community with explicit 
formal standards against which states can be evaluated.186 States that view 
themselves as members of the international community will self-consciously 
conform to those standards to gain international legitimacy. 
This international paradigm is most prominently enshrined in the core United 
Nations human rights treaties. As a normative matter, the very premise of the 
international human rights regime is that some rights are universal, no matter where 
you are born.187 Since the Second World War, a growing number of rights are 
protected by international law.188 These treaties are widely ratified by, and thus 
legally binding upon, the largest majority of states. Many of these rights have 
achieved the status of customary international law, making them legally binding 
even upon states that did not ratify these treaties.189 In addition to their legal status, 
human rights treaties have strong normative appeal because they represent a global 
consensus among nation states. By design, international human rights treaties seek 
to articulate and advance a global consensus on human rights.190 States that want to 
signal good intentions to the international community, and self-consciously aim to 
be part of that community, are therefore likely to conform to the standardized 
constitutional models enshrined in international human rights treaties.191 
                                                                                                                 
Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 144–45 (1997) (“Many features of the 
contemporary nation-state derive from worldwide models constructed and propagated 
through global cultural and associational processes.”). 
 186. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Constitutional Variation Among Strains of 
Authoritarianism, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 165, 170 (Tom Ginsburg 
& Alberto Simpser eds., 2014). 
 187. E.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2 (1990) (“Human rights are universal: 
they belong to every human being in every human society. They do not differ with 
geography or history, culture or ideology, political or economic system, or stage of societal 
development.”). 
 188. See, e.g., TODD LANDMAN, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 4 
(2005) (“[E]ven the most optimistic observers in 1948 could not have imagined the 
subsequent growth and influence of human rights discourse and doctrine. . . . .” (citation 
omitted)); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 36 (2009) (“The most striking fact about the international law of human 
rights is its nearly complete absence prior to the end of World War II.”). 
 189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 702 (1987) (“A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, 
encourages or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing 
the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination or (g) a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”). 
 190. Christof Heyns & Frans Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights 
Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 483, 488 (2001) (“The treaty system has 
largely defined the international consensus on human rights norms . . . .”). 
 191. See, e.g., GRAHAM HASSALL & CHERYL SAUNDERS, ASIA-PACIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL 
SYSTEMS 1 (2002) (“The [Universal] Declaration of Human Rights . . . must surely have had 
more impact on thinking about law, constitutionalism and governance than any other 
document produced in the last century.”); JACKSON, supra note 13, at 40 (“[M]any foreign 
constitutions drafted since World War II rely on international human rights instruments (or 
on other constitutions that relied on these instruments) as archetypes, leading to parallel 
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While rooted in different logics, functionalism and universalism both produce 
standardized documents,192 rather than distinct statements of national values that 
serve to differentiate nations from one another. And in practice, they often blend 
together, presenting constitutional designers with a limited number of standardized 
models, and limiting designers’ discretion to express any popular values that would 
deviate from these models.193 
C. The Dilemma for Constitutional Design 
Functionalism and universalism may, at times, contradict the ideal of popular 
self-expression. At first blush, it may seem that the expression of national values, 
the articulation of universal norms, and the functional design of certain objectives 
can all be achieved with the same instrument.194 For example, the preamble could 
proclaim the nation’s values, the bill of rights could enshrine a standardized 
package of universal rights, and state-of-the-art principles of constitutional design 
could be brought to bear on the structural part of the constitution. Yet where 
national values are more than rhetorical statements and permeate the substantive 
portion of the constitution, a tension can emerge. Popular values can clash both 
with functionalism’s recipes for constitutional design and with universalism’s 
notion that a core set of rights should be adopted everywhere. 
To illustrate the former, consider the example of socioeconomic rights. In 
developing countries, as elsewhere, the people value deeply the right to food, the 
right to housing, and the right to an adequate standard of living. In fact, alleviating 
poverty and malnutrition may be a leading goal for the future.195 But when the 
government is incapable of fulfilling these rights, there exists a risk that including 
them will relegate the entire constitution to a merely aspirational document. That is, 
if the government routinely violates the right to food, for example, it will come as 
less of a surprise when it does the same for the prohibition of torture.196 As a result, 
functionalism counsels against popular self-expression on socioeconomic rights. 
                                                                                                                 
rights-protecting provisions.”); Heyns & Viljoen, supra note 190, at 500 (noting, based on 
case-study research, that the human rights instruments promulgated by the United Nations 
have strongly influenced constitution-making in various countries). 
 192. See Tushnet, supra note 34, at 67, 74 (noting that both functionalists and 
universalists look for universal principles). 
 193. Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1163–64 (finding that ninety percent of all variation 
in the world’s constitutions is explained by two underlying dimensions: (1) the general 
tendency of a country to include few or many rights and (2) whether the document is more 
statist or libertarian in nature). 
 194. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 13, at 648–50 (conceptualizing constitutions as 
national identity and contrasting it with constitutions as operating systems); Mark Tushnet, 
The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1269–74 (1999) 
(conceptualizing the “expressive” function of constitutions and contrasting it with more 
functionalist perspectives on constitutions). 
 195. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 82, at 868 (noting that Chad’s constitution promises 
free and universal education, even though only one third of the population is literate, and 
Afghanistan’s constitution promises universal healthcare, even though it has the lowest life 
expectancy rate in the world). 
 196. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and 
Economic Guarantees, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 65, at 
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Perhaps even more importantly, fidelity to popular values may produce 
documents that are overly elaborate, in that they turn all potentially appealing 
values into constitutional ones. To illustrate, the 2008 Constitution of 
Ecuadorwritten with widespread popular input197enshrines rights to 
locally-produced nutritious food, rights for breastfeeding mothers, a right to clean 
city air, along with a sweeping range of other goals.198 A number of other recent 
documents in Latin America are made of similar cloth.199 Such documents are 
likely to be popular, as people are typically in favor of enshrining a wide range of 
appealing goals into their constitution.200 For the functionalist, however, such 
documents raise concerns about the enforceability of these goals, as well as about 
the appropriate role for the judiciary in a democratic society.201 Thus, functionalism 
suggests caution against an overly broad catalogue of constitutional rights. 
Popular self-expression can also undermine international human rights norms. 
In the name of tradition and deeply held cultural values, some nations have 
permitted genital mutilation, even though the practice violates core principles of 
women’s equality, as defined under international law.202 In the name of culture, 
                                                                                                                 
90, 101–02 (expressing doubt on “whether the many constitutions containing social and 
economic rights have made any difference at all ‘on the ground’”). 
 197. Stephan Küffner & Joshua Partlow, Voters in Ecuador Approve Constitution: New 
Document Would Enhance Presidential Powers, Allow Consecutive Terms, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 29, 2008, at A14 (noting that “at least 65 percent of Ecuadorans voted for the 
constitution” in a public referendum); Carlo Ruiz Giraldo, Social Participation and Prior 
Consultation Rights in Ecuador: An Unfinished Dream?, CONSTITUTIONNET (Aug. 28, 
2013), http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/social-participation-and-prior-consultation
-rights-ecuador-unfinished-dream (“[S]ocial participation was . . . a key feature of Ecuador’s 
constitutional project both in terms of content and process.”). 
 198. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR art. 13 (declaring the right 
to safe and permanent access to “healthy, sufficient and nutritional food” that is “preferably 
produced locally and in keeping with their various identities and cultural traditions”); id. art. 
43 (guaranteeing pregnant women and breastfeeding mothers the right to (1) not be 
discriminated against on the basis of pregnancy in school, public, and work, (2) free and 
maternal healthcare services, (3) priority protection and care for their health and life from 
pregnancy to postpartum, and (4) healthcare facilities for post-pregnancy recovery and 
breastfeeding); id. art. 276(4) (mandating the state to promote environmental conservation 
and restoration in order to guarantee the permanent and quality access to air). 
 199. See King, supra note 24, at 81, 190–201 (describing how the constitutions of 
Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia enshrine a radical list of values). 
 200. See Part IV.B (finding that constitutions with more comprehensive bills of rights 
enjoy larger popular support); see also Ginsburg et al., supra note 12, at 218 (finding 
empirically that constitutions produced through popular referendum “are more likely to have 
virtually every category of right”); Lansberg-Rodriguez, supra note 50 (noting that an 
extensive package of rights usually receives an affirmative vote in popular referenda). 
 201. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa 1, 
3 (The Law Sch. of the Univ. of Chi., John M. Olin Law & Economics Paper Series No. 124, 
2001) (noting that many critics of social and economic rights worry that these rights are 
beyond judicial capabilities, and put the judiciary in charge of overseeing large-scale 
bureaucratic institutions). 
 202. See General Recommendation No. 14: Female Circumcision, Comm. on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 9th Sess., Jan. 22–Feb. 2, 1990, U.N. Doc. 
A/45/38, at 80 (June 6, 1990) (recommending that states eradicate the practice of female 
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some constitutions have proclaimed group rights over individual rights203 and 
reinstated traditional institutions.204 In the name of certain religious values, 
women’s rights have been curtailed, and women’s ability to have an abortion has 
been restricted.205 Likewise, calling upon the people’s desire for economic growth, 
some leaders have prioritized socioeconomic rights over civil liberties.206 More 
generally, the minority rights protected by international human rights law are easily 
flouted by the wishes of the majority. 
To illustrate how popular values can clash with universal rights norms, consider 
the new Hungarian Constitution. Written in 2011, the document has the explicit 
goal of becoming a “source of patriotism and common creed” for the Hungarian 
nation.207 Not only does the document have a lengthy preamble, its substantive part 
is also made short and accessible to lay readers, compared with its lengthy and 
technical predecessor.208 Unlike the previous document, it protects the life of 
fetuses from the moment of conception and restricts marriage to partners of 
opposite sexes.209 It moreover restricts the power of the judiciary to overturn 
                                                                                                                 
circumcision); Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 
48/104, art. 2(a), U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/48/49, at 217 (Dec. 
20, 1993) (stating that female genital mutilation is a form of violence against women). 
 203. See Cobbah, supra note 58, at 322, 323, 328 (describing the “African worldview” as 
emphasizing “group solidarity and collective responsibility” and noting that African 
Constitutions “have been everything but African”). 
 204. See, e.g., PROCLAMATION BY HIS MAJESTY KING SOBHUZA II [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 
12, 1973 (Swaz.) (noting “that the [1968 Independence] constitution has permitted the 
importation into our country of highly undesirable political practices alien to, and 
incompatible with the way of life in our society . . . increasingly this element engenders 
hostility, bitterness and unrest in our peaceful society”). The 1973 Proclamation abolished 
parliament and reinstated the traditional institution of the Swazi King. Id. 
 205. There is a growing consensus that access to abortion might be required under 
international human rights law. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, General Recommendation No. 26: Women Migrant Workers, ¶ 18, 42d Sess., Oct. 
20–Nov. 7, 2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R (Dec. 5, 2008) (noting that 
“[d]iscrimination may be especially acute in relation to pregnancy” and suggesting that 
access to abortion services is required by Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW)). 
 206. See Kausikan, supra note 58, at 35 (suggesting that “order and stability” are 
“preconditions for economic growth,” while growth is “the necessary foundation” for 
fulfilling civil and political rights). For an official statement of the “Asian position” on 
human rights, see World Conference on Human Rights, Mar. 29, 1993–Apr. 2, 1993, Report 
of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights (“Bangkok 
Declaration”), ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8-A/CONF.157/PC/59 (Apr. 7, 1993). 
 207. István Stumpf, Judge, Constitutional Court of Hung., The Birth of a New 
Fundamental Law of Hungary, Keynote Address at the Heritage Foundation (Oct. 11, 2012), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2013/05/model-resource-or-outlier-what-effect-has-
the-us-constitution-had-on-the-recently-adopted-constitutions-of-other-nations. 
 208. Id. (“[O]ne of the main objectives of drafting a shorter . . . and easier to understand 
constitution for Hungary was to make it more accessible and meaningful for average 
Hungarian citizens.”). 
 209. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY, [CONSTITUTION] art. 2 (“[T]he life of a 
foetus will be protected from the moment of conception.”); id. art. L (“Hungary shall protect 
the institution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman.”). 
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democratic legislation.210 While widely condemned by the Council of Europe and 
the United States for failing to adequately protect rights,211 this “people’s 
constitution” enshrines values that are reportedly held by the majority of Hungarian 
people.212 
Likewise, the short-lived 2012 Egyptian constitution was filled with rhetoric of 
national identity and demonstrated fidelity to the Islamic values held by a majority 
of Egyptians.213 Yet minority groups—most notably the Coptic community and 
liberal women’s groups—were worried from the outset that the document would 
not adequately protect their rights.214 Even though the document enjoyed support 
from a majority of Egyptians and was approved by popular referendum, human 
rights organizations strongly condemned the document for failing to protect human 
rights.215 The dramatic aftermath of the document, which was abandoned the day 
the newly elected President Morsi was ousted by the military, shows the danger of 
documents that are all too majoritarian and fail to protect minority rights.216 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210. See Hungary: Constitution Changes Warrant EU Action, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (Mar. 
12, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/12/hungary-constitution-changes-warrant-eu-
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 211. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 
2011, 10:31 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/hungarys-constitutional
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Prepare to Vote on It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2012, at A6 (describing the contested provisions 
in the document that is currently being written). 
 214. David D. Kirkpatrick, Thousands of Egyptians Protest Plan for Charter, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at A6 (reporting that “[t]he crowd appeared more affluent than those at 
the usual Tahir Square protests,” and that there “was an unusually high concentration of 
women, especially for an event after dark, and very few traditional Islamic headscarves” as 
well as “a heavy representation from Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority”). 
 215. See David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, Egypt Islamists Expect Approval of 
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2012, at A1 (“Many international experts faulted the 
charter as a missed opportunity, stuffed with broad statements about Egyptian identity but 
riddled with loopholes regarding the protection of rights.”); Egypt’s New Constitution 
Mixed on Support for Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/29/egypt-new-constitution-mixed-support-rights; 
(providing an overview of problematic articles in the Rights and Freedoms chapter of the 
draft constitution). 
 216. Daniel Lansberg-Rodriquez, An Obituary for the Egyptian Constitution, Dec. 26, 
2012–July 3, 2013, FOREIGN POL’Y, (July 3, 2013, 8:11 PM), http://transitions.foreignpolicy. 
com/posts/2013/07/03/an_obituary_for_the_egyptian_constitution_dec_26_2012_july_3_2013. 
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While normatively appealing from an outside perspective, functionalism and 
universalism come with their own distinct set of problems. They are troubling from 
the viewpoint of democratic theory when they constrain majorities without the 
legitimacy of higher law-making.217 But there is also a more practical concern with 
such documents. Where documents lack popular support, they are less likely to 
work in practice. The experience of post-colonial constitution-making in Africa 
illustrates this danger. Almost all of Britain’s former colonies in Africa, upon 
independence, received the exact same bill of rights.218 These boilerplate bills of 
rights had a distinctively libertarian character and emphasized negative liberty 
rights, while omitting socioeconomic rights. They were technical, lawyer-drafted 
documents with an exhaustive list of limitation clauses within each provision.219 In 
fact, all these bills of rights were modeled after the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.220 But in most cases, they failed to deal 
with the most pressing issues of the newly established African states: deep ethnic 
tensions and persistent poverty. Their libertarian principles never functioned in 
practice.221 
This post-colonial experience relates to a long-established truism in comparative 
law, which is that transplanted laws (i.e., laws exported from one country to 
another) often remain a dead letter regardless of how desirable they may be on 
paper.222 Transplanted laws, it has been found, suffer from a “transplant effect” that 
renders them ineffective because they are unrelated to local views, traditions, and 
practices.223 Functionalism and universalism in constitutional design potentially 
                                                                                                                 
 
 217. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 218. See CHARLES PARKINSON, BILLS OF RIGHTS AND DECOLONIZATION 1–19 (2007) 
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COMP. L. 111, 118–20 (1997) (suggesting that “at best, what can be displaced from one 
jurisdiction to another is, literally, a meaningless form of words” and that “[n]o rule in the 
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 223. Compare Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic 
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contribute to such a transplant effect, or produce documents that have much to 
admire on paper, but that fail to work in practice.224 
In sum, where popular self-expression affects substantive constitutional choices, 
real tensions can take shape. A constitution that expresses popular values may 
undermine the principles of constitutional functionalism and universalism, just as a 
universal or functional constitution may undermine popular self-expression. For 
real-world constitutional designers, the competing logics of popular values on the 
one hand, and functionalism and universalism on the other, constitute a real 
dilemma that goes to the very nature of constitutions. The findings from this Article 
suggest that, when confronted with this dilemma, most real-world 
constitution-makers have favored functionalism and universalism over popular self-
expression. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has presented the first comprehensive empirical exploration of the 
relationship between people’s values and their constitutions. Its main finding, that 
there exists only a weak relationship between constitutional choices and popular 
values, may come as a surprise to many readers. In a comparative perspective, 
countries whose people attach importance to the values associated with certain 
rights are no more likely to enshrine these rights in their constitution than countries 
whose people do not share those values. Moreover, within any given country, there 
often exists a considerable gap between constitutional choices and popular values. 
This gap lacks popular support: in most cases, people do want to enshrine their 
values in their constitution. 
These observations contradict some of the core assumptions of contemporary 
constitutional theory. As the nation’s highest legal documents, constitutions are 
commonly attributed with strong democratic legitimacy.225 Especially when the 
constitution serves as a basis for invalidating ordinary legislation, constitutional 
theory demands that the constitution be more democratic than ordinary legislation, 
or else the practice of judicial review would be hard to justify from a democratic 
perspective. This Article’s findings suggest that many of the world’s constitutions 
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fall short of this demand, and thus, that the counter-majoritarian problem remains 
unresolved. On a whole, there exists little support for the claim that judicial review 
channels the true will of the people as enshrined in the constitutional document. 
The findings from this Article raise the question of whose values constitutions 
reflect, if not those of popular majorities. On the one hand, it is possible that the 
experts who draft many constitutions carefully balance popular self-expression 
against more universalist and functional considerations.226 On the other hand, 
constitutions could simply reflect the idiosyncratic preferences of the documents’ 
authors. They could also reflect the values of governing elites, for example, who 
write the documents to protect their private values not shared by the general 
population.227 The quantitative empirical approach in this Article merely offers a 
bird’s-eye view of global constitution-making; it is unable to discern the 
motivations of constitution drafters. Further research is required to explain the 
puzzle of unpopular constitutionalism and to establish what kinds of values are 
enforced in the name of “We the People.” 
Finally, the findings from this Article also raise the question of how to 
normatively evaluate the phenomenon of unpopular constitutionalism that appears 
to characterize the world’s constitutions. On the one hand, constitutions that are 
disconnected from popular opinion may be more prone to failure, as the British 
colonial experience illustrates. Moreover, such unpopular documents are troubling 
from the perspective of constitutional theories that hold that constitutions should 
enjoy larger democratic legitimacy than ordinary legislation. On the other hand, 
populist constitutions might come with their own set of problems. Most notably, 
they might fail to protect minority rights and make choices that are undesirable 
from a universalist or functionalist perspective. The grand failure of Egypt’s 2012 
constitution illustrates how an overly majoritarian document can fail to protect 
minority rights, and might even induce widespread civic unrest.228 
Ultimately, the decision of whether to write a populist constitution entails a 
weighing of the relative costs and benefits of populism versus the costs and 
benefits of a disconnect from popular values. How these considerations work out 
likely depends on time and place. To illustrate, countries with deep ethnic or 
religious divides might consider a gap between the constitution and popular values 
necessary, because a majoritarian document would fail to protect minority groups. 
By contrast, more homogeneous societies might be able to reap the benefits of 
populist constitutions without incurring substantial costs. It is not my goal to 
develop a wholesale recommendation for all countries. Instead, my goal has been 
more modest, to highlight the gap between constitutional theory and constitutional 
practice. But such a modest goal might have far-reaching implications nonetheless. 
Indeed, while it is still possible for constitutional scholars to argue normatively that 
constitutions should reflect popular values, they can no longer assume that they 
actually do. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 226. See supra Part VI. 
 227. See HIRSCHL, supra note 148 passim (suggesting that constitutions reflect the values 
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